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Preface 
Based on EU’s Animal Health Strategy 2007 – 2013 the Danish Veterinary and Food 
Administration (DVFA) have asked University of Copenhagen to analyze different 
incentive models for implementing disease preventive efforts in the animal produc-
tion. Among other things, DVFA wants investigated which incentives will promote 
disease preventive measures at the herd level. This include both models that have po-
sitive effects on the production economy and other models that provide other benefits 
to the livestock keeper such as compensation for economic losses for movement stand 
still zones in case of outbreak of an contagious animal disease.      
 
The report is written by Senior Researcher Mogens Lund, Professor Jens Leth 
Hougaard and PhD student Juliet Biira from the Institute of Food and Resource Eco-
nomics and Professor Hans Houe, Department of Large Animal Sciences. 
 
 
Mogens Lund 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics 
Copenhagen, December 2012 
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1. Danish summary and recommendations 
Med udgangspunkt i EU’s dyresundhedsstrategi 2007 - 2013 har Fødevarestyrelsen 
bedt om at få belyst forskellige incitamentsmodeller for gennemførsel af smittebe-
skyttende tiltag i husdyrproduktionen. Fødevarestyrelsen ønsker bl.a. undersøgt, hvil-
ke incitamenter der vil fremme indførslen af smittebeskyttende foranstaltninger på 
besætningsniveau. Det gælder både modeller, der har positiv effekt på produktions-
økonomien, og modeller, hvor der opnås andre benefits for besætningsejeren, som fx 
mulighed for kompensation for økonomiske tab i forbindelse med restriktioner indført 
ved udbrud af en alvorlig smitsom sygdom.  
 
På den baggrund er formålet med nærværende rapport at undersøge de økonomiske 
incitamenter til smittebeskyttelse på besætningsniveau med henblik på at sikre en fair 
og efficient deling af ansvaret og omkostningerne ved risikostyring og overvågning af 
husdyrsygdomme, som angivet i EU’s dyresundhedsstrategi.  
 
Rapporten giver et overblik over biosecurity begrebet og beskriver de generelle me-
kanismer bag økonomiske incitamenter. Mere specifikt belyses følgende spørgsmål i 
rapporten:          
          
1. Hvad er de eksisterende incitamenter og barrierer til smittebeskyttelse blandt 
især svine- og kvægproducenter? 
2. Hvad er de eksisterende kompensationsregler og finansieringskilder ved ud-
brud af smitsomme husdyrsygdomme og hvordan ser de ud i forhold til andre 
lande?  
3. Hvad er mulighederne for at give husdyrproducenter bedre incitamenter til 
smittebeskyttelse? 
  
Fokus er på alvorligt smitsomme sygdomme i kvæg- og svinebesætninger, dvs. syg-
domme som har alvorlige konsekvenser for både sundhedstilstanden og produktionen 
samt det øvrige samfund (sygdomme som er kategoriseret som Liste 1 sygdomme af 
de danske veterinære myndigheder). Disse sygdomme, som bl.a. omfatter bl.a. mund- 
og klovsyge, Bluetongue og klassisk svinepest, har alle potentiale til at medføre om-
fattende økonomiske tab i tilfælde af et udbrud.   
 
Rapportens analytiske del omfatter kapitel 3 til 6, hvor det undersøges, hvordan såvel 
de direkte som de indirekte økonomiske incitamenter kan ændres med henblik på at 
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give landmænd bedre økonomiske incitamenter til øget smittebeskyttelse i deres be-
sætninger. De gennemførte analyser er overvejende baseret på kvalitative beskrivel-
ser, vurderinger og evalueringer.    
 
Kapitel 3 indeholder en forholdsvis detaljeret beskrivelse af principperne for smitte-
spredning og specifikke sygdomsforebyggende aktiviteter i svine- og kvægbesætnin-
ger. Hovedpointerne er her at:    
 
 indkøb og andre flytninger af dyr mellem besætninger bør minimeres 
 dyr bør købes fra besætninger med højere sundhedsstatus  
 dyr som flyttes fra en fremmed besætning til en anden bør i karantæne  
 dobbelt hegn bør tages i anvendelse ved afgræsning af dyr  
 skilte med “Adgang forbudt” bør sættes op  
 alle instrumenter og udstyr bør så vidt muligt være tilgængelige på ejendom-
men, således at der ikke er behov for at flytte disse rundt mellem flere besæt-
ninger  
 køretøjer til dyretransport og disses chauffører bør ikke komme i direkte kon-
takt med besætningen   
 dyr bør så vidt muligt opdrættes i hold ved brug af alt-ind – alt-ud produkti-
onssystemer  
 sammenblanding af unge og gamle dyr bør undgås  
 der bør være etableret skadedyrsbekæmpelse   
 det er ikke muligt præcist at sige, hvornår et bestemt antal smitteforebyggen-
de foranstaltninger er tilstrækkelige til at sikre mod overførsel af husdyrsyg-
domme og hvornår det er “overkill”    
 
I kapitel 4 er den økonomiske betydning af og sammenhængene mellem private og 
offentlige incitamenter til smittebeskyttelse i kvæg- og svineproduktionen analyseret. 
Hovedpointerne er her at: 
 
 landmænds private incitamenter kan føre til for få investeringer i smittebe-
skyttelse   
 for at fremme den sygdomsforebyggende adfærd blandt producenter er det 
nødvendigt at lave en risikoklassificering af bedrifter med husdyr    
 denne risikoklassificering bør baseres på simple og gennemsigtige mål for ri-
sikofaktorer  
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 en selvrisiko bør indgå i et system for omkostningsdeling for at reducere mu-
lighederne for uhensigtsmæssig adfærd blandt husdyrproducenter  
 landmænds økonomiske bidrag til en omkostningsdeling bør baseres på en 
kombination af ex-ante og ex-post betalinger i forhold til et sygdomsudbrud 
 landmænd bør ikke modtage økonomisk kompensation for syge eller døde 
dyr, men kun modtage kompensation for de raske dyr, som skal nedslagtes, 
for at sikre de økonomiske incitamenter til en hurtig anmeldelse af et potenti-
elt udbrud 
 landmænd, som påvirkes negativt af beskyttelses- og overvågningszoner i til-
fælde af et alvorligt sygdomsudbrud, bør økonomisk kompenseres, men kom-
pensationen skal ikke overstige minimum af produktionsomkostningerne og 
markedsprisen  
 en forsikringsordning med medfinansiering fra det offentliges side bør base-
res på tvungen deltagelse af alle relevante husdyrproducenter  
 som følge af den lave eller sjældne forekomst af visse sygdomme, kan den 
enkelte landmand undervurdere risikoen for at blive ramt af en alvorlig hus-
dyrsygdom og derfor reducere hans forebyggende indsats          
 
I kapitel 5 er de eksisterende danske erstatningsregler og finansieringsinstrumenter, 
som anvendes i tilfælde af udbrud af en alvorlig smitsom husdyrsygdom, undersøgt 
og sammenlignet med de tilsvarende ordninger i Holland og Tyskland. Hovedpointer-
ne er her at:   
 
 lovpligtige veterinære fonde er etableret i både Holland og Tyskland, men ik-
ke i Danmark           
 de hollandske kompensationsregler ikke giver erstatning for døde dyr som 
følge af en epidemisk sygdom for at give landmænd incitament til tidlig an-
meldelse af en sygdomsmistanke     
 incitamenterne for producenterne og det offentlige skifter i det hollandske sy-
stem, når det aftalte loft for økonomisk kompensation er nået. Når dette loft 
overskrides, har producenterne intet finansielt medansvar for dækning af de 
direkte omkostninger til bekæmpelse af et alvorligt sygdomsudbrud 
 i Tyskland er der en fond for dyresygdomme i hver forbundsstat, hvilket gør 
det muligt at tage hensyn til regionale forskelle med hensyn til fx bedrifts-
struktur og i de epidemiske risici mellem regioner          
 i Tyskland er der flere erfaringer med risikojusteret kompensation og med 
økonomisk medfinansiering fra landmændenes side end i Danmark         
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I kapitel 6 er nogle strategiske muligheder for forbedringer i de sygdomsforebyggen-
de foranstaltninger på bedrifts- og besætningsniveau ved brug af økonomiske incita-
menter diskuteret. Hovedpointerne er her at: 
 
 et system til omkostningsdeling bør bygge på et hensigtsmæssigt smittebe-
skyttelsesindeks defineret på bedrifts- eller besætningsniveau  
 smittebeskyttelsesindekset bør være afgrænset til dyresundheds- og tilhørende 
produktionsaspekter og ikke omfatte fx dyrevelfærd  
 det er afgørende, at der er en entydig korrelation mellem landmænds forebyg-
gende indsats og indeksværdien, og at de variable, som indgår i indekset, kan 
måles på en objektiv måde 
 det bør overvejes at offentliggøre smittebeskyttelsesindekset for at opnå de 
største incitament-fremmende effekter 
 den konkrete konstruktion af et sådant indeks og alle de heraf afledede konse-
kvenser bør forskningsmæssigt undersøges og politisk afklares inden det ta-
ges i brug   
 de afgørende elementer, som har indflydelse på infektionsrisikoen og organi-
seringen af beskyttelses- og overvågningszoner i tilfælde af et alvorligt syg-
domsudbrud, bør næremere analyseres    
                   
Som følge af ovennævnte hovedpointer er svaret på rapportens første spørgsmål om, 
hvad de eksisterende incitamenter til smittebeskyttelse er blandt især svine- og mæl-
keproducenter, at der ikke eksisterer tilstrækkelige incitamenter blandt landmænd til 
at sikre en samfundsmæssig optimal smittebeskyttelse. Vores anbefaling er derfor, at 
mulighederne for udvikling af et smittebeskyttelsesindeks bør forskningsmæssigt un-
dersøges, og at alle positive og eventuelle negative konsekvenser forbundet hermed 
grundigt undersøges. Udvikling af et sådant indeks skal ses som et vigtigt skridt hen 
imod en mere fair og efficient deling af alle de samfundsøkonomiske omkostninger til 
håndtering af alvorligt smitsomme husdyrsygdomme mellem på den ene side land-
mænd (og eventuelt andre i produktionskæden) og på den anden side den offentlige 
sektor. I den forbindelse bør de praktiske erfaringer fra bl.a. SPF systemet og den 
forskningsbaserede viden fra bl.a. udvikling af velfærdsindeks for husdyr udnytes.   
 
Svaret på det andet spørgsmål om, hvad de eksisterende kompensationsregler og fi-
nansieringskilder er ved udbrud af smitsomme husdyrsygdomme og hvordan ser de 
ud i forhold til andre lande er, at vi i Danmark ikke har en selvstændig veterinær fond 
i modsætning til en række andre af de lande, som vi normalt sammenligner os med. 
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Derfor anbefales det, at det overvejes at etablere en eller flere sådanne fonde for at 
skabe en yderligere mekanisme til at etablere en stærkere sammenhæng mellem 
landmænds tiltag til forbedring af smittebeskyttelsen og deres bidrag til finansiering 
af relevante initiativer i både fredstid, dvs. i perioder uden sygdoms mistanker og ud-
brud af alvorlige husdyrsygdomme og i perioder med alvorlige udbrud. I den forbin-
delse vil det være naturligt at undersøge, hvilke rolle de nuværende produktionsaf-
giftsfonde i landbruget kan spille.      
                  
Det tredje hovedspørgsmål i rapporten vedrører mulighederne for at give husdyrpro-
ducenter bedre incitamenter til smittebeskyttelse. Her er svaret, at selvom der ikke ek-
sisterer tilstrækkelige private incitamenter til at sikre en samfundsmæssig optimal 
smittebeskyttelse, er der alligevel flere muligheder for at give husdyrproducenter bed-
re økonomiske incitamenter til at undgå dyresygdomme. Sammenhængen mellem den 
store variation i niveauet for biosecurity hos husdyrproducenter, som beskrevet i af-
snit 3.4, og de forskellige typer af effektiv forebyggelse, som beskrevet i afsnit 4.3, 
indeholder nøglen til at se disse muligheder. I afsnit 4.3 blev det vist, hvordan en ef-
fektiv forebyggelse både kan baseres på kontrol og sanktioner; læring og informati-
onsdeling; og udvikling af nye innovative tiltag.    
 
Derfor er det anbefalet, at den eksisterende lovgivning og de fastsatte regler bliver 
bedre kontrolleret og sikret overholdt. Det giver for eksempel forkerte signaler til 
landmænd, når der på den ene side er et juridisk krav om at lave en smittebeskyttel-
sesplan på større landbrug med kvæg og svin, men dette krav på den anden side ikke 
bliver håndhævet (se nærmere herom i afsnit 3.4).   
 
Det anbefales endvidere, at “best practice” med hensyn til smittebeskyttelse blandt 
husdyrproducenter identificeres og dokumenteres, og at denne viden videreformidles 
til alle landmænd med husdyr. Benchmarking er allerede et udbredt værktøj i rådgiv-
ningstjenesten til at motivere beslutningstagere til at gennemføre forandringer i deres 
produktion.  
 
Endelig anbefales det, at de praktiske udviklingsaktiviteter forstærkes med hensyn til 
smittebeskyttelse ved at give finansiel støtte, fx gennem produktionsafgiftsfondene og 
Grønt Udviklings- og Demonstrationsprogram GUDP, til gennemførelse af tværfagli-
ge innovationsprojekter. Det bygger på en forventning om, at en større deltagelse af 
husdyrproducenter i udviklingen af nye tiltag inden for sygdomsforebyggelse både vil 
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give mere praktisk brugbare løsninger og give landmændene incitament til at tage 
større ansvar for smittebeskyttelsen af deres dyr.         
 
10     
2. Introduction 
Questions concerning the responsibility for  prevention and control of contagious an-
imal diseases and how and who should finance the indemnities in case of an epidemic 
animal disease outbreak have been discussed for a long period of time between farm-
ers and their associations on the one hand and different public authorities on the other. 
The reason is that both the agricultural sector and the society at large have high inter-
ests in avoiding contagious animal diseases which may jeopardize farmers’ income, 
public health, export of agricultural products, consumer confidence and employment 
opportunities.  
 
For more than 100 years there has been a Danish national legislation which has pro-
vided laws and rules for control and eradication of animal diseases with high socio-
economic costs. The regulation has included rules for culling of infected herds and 
how the affected farmers should be compensated for the loss of animals and related 
income.  
 
The launch of EU’s new Animal Health Strategy 2007 – 2013 has revived the debate 
about how to share the responsibilities and costs with respect to the prevention and 
control of animal diseases between animal keepers, the public sector and other stake-
holders. The overall principle in the strategy is that “prevention is better than cure”. 
This means a change in policy focus from control of disease outbreaks to risk man-
agement prevention and surveillance. In the report, we look at the economic incen-
tives for a fair and efficient sharing of these responsibilities and costs.     
2.1. Objectives  
The report addresses the following questions: 
 
1. What are the existing economic incentives and barriers for animal disease 
prevention, especially for pig and cattle farmers? 
2. What are the current compensation and risk financing schemes for infectious 
disease outbreaks in Denmark and how does it compare to schemes in other 
countries? 
3. What are the opportunities for providing livestock farmers with improved in-
centives to prevent animal diseases? 
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The focus of this report is on highly infectious cattle and pig diseases (categorized as 
List 1 diseases by the Danish Veterinary and Food Authorities). These diseases in-
clude for example Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Bluetongue and Classical Swine 
Fever (CSF) and they have the potential to cause widespread economic losses. The 
protection of animal health is very complex as it covers many interrelated areas such 
as disease management, biosecurity, animal welfare, legislative and regulatory issues, 
trade of animals and animal products and even the risks of bioterrorism. Therefore, a 
large number of relevant issues related to the management of animal disease risks are 
not explicitly addressed in the report including subjects such as the use of medicine 
and antibiotics, animal welfare issues (although some indirectly effects of diseases on 
animal welfare may be addressed), zoonotic foodborne diseases such as salmonella 
and campylobacter and special animal health issues e.g. on hobby farms and niche 
productions.  
 
Parallel with writing this report, the Danish Veterinary Contingency Planning is under 
scrutiny and the changes decided may affect farmers’ and other stakeholders’ incen-
tives for disease prevention and control. This is especially true when it comes to 
farmers’ early recognition of a disease outbreak and the commercial and economic 
consequences associated with the establishment of movement and marketing re-
strictions in case of a serious disease outbreak.   
2.2. Stakeholders in the animal health system 
Animal health is a concern not only for animal keepers but for all citizens in the so-
ciety. This concern stems not only from the public health and food safety aspects of 
animal health, but also from the economic costs that an animal disease outbreak can 
trigger and the animal welfare considerations, including the implication for disease 
control, (European Commission, 2007).  
 
Partnerships with all interested parties concerned with animal health are the new ap-
proach adopted by EU and its member states. Thus, producers, consumers and other 
stakeholders are expected to play a role in the improvement of animal health and wel-
fare. EU’s new Animal Health Strategy 2007 – 2013 should be built on trust, open-
ness and willingness to take difficult decisions, but also the willingness to share the 
responsibilities and costs associated with high animal health standards.    
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One way of mapping the stakeholders at different levels involved in animal health is 
shown in Figure 2.1.   
 
Overall, in order to improve farmers’ incentives for disease prevention and increase 
the sharing of responsibility and costs, farmers need to work together with other sup-
ply chain partners, e.g. slaughterhouses, feeding companies and vets; industry asso-
ciations, e.g. the Danish Agricultural and Food Council, and public authorities, e.g. 
the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration. However, public authorities also in-
clude many international public and semi-public organizations such as the European 
Union, The World Trade Organization and The World Organization for Animal 
Health.    
 
The Danish Agricultural & Food Council (DAFC) is an umbrella organization repre-
senting Danish farmers and the Danish food industry. Its major objectives are to in-
fluence political decisions to benefit farmers and the food industry and to provide 
good and efficient services to all its members. DAFC collaborates with the Danish 
veterinary authorities (see below) on making rules and regulations concerning animal 
health and welfare. To ensure compliance with this regulation, DAFC also partici-
pates in advisory activities, campaigns and in the education of farmers and other em-
ployees in the agricultural (and food) industry. While most agricultural advisers are 
employed by industry, this is not the general case for veterinarians. Typically, veteri-
narians, who provide health management services to individual livestock holders, are 
operating as private actors in the supply chain.  
 
Figure 2.1. Stakeholders in the animal health system 
Industry 
associations
Public 
authorities
Supply chain 
partners
Livestock 
farmers
Disease 
prevention
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The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration (DVFA) is a public authority re-
sponsible for food safety and health in the agricultural (and food) supply chain. In the 
field of animal health DVFA aims at adapting the legal framework for disease preven-
tion and control to minimize the risks of introduction and spread of animal diseases in 
Denmark. Livestock registration, disease surveillance, disease notification, quaran-
tines, health advisory agreements and biosecurity plans are some of the measures 
adopted. Furthermore, inspection and control are done at several levels including on 
farm inspections, border control of imported animals and animal products and the 
control of B2B trade and transportation of animals.  
 
DVFA also has the responsibility for the contingency planning to ensure a rapid and 
effective response to any suspicious and actual outbreaks of an infectious animal dis-
ease. The Danish contingency planning consists of four parts: A preventive prepared-
ness concerning disease prevention at different levels; surveillance to ensure early no-
tification of diseases; an operational preparedness for a timely and efficient manage-
ment of a disease outbreak; and the laboratorial preparedness to ensure a quick and 
reliable diagnostic and testing capability. The different contingency activities can be 
categorized to those performed in peace time, i.e. when there are no suspicions or 
outbreaks; those that are initiated during the period of a suspicion; and the activities 
during the time of an infectious disease outbreak, DVFA (2012).       
 
The European Union (EU) is an example of an international public stakeholder partic-
ipating in the risk management of animal health. In the EU, the European Commis-
sion, the EU Parliament, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the 
European Food Safety Authority and the European Medicines Agency are some of the 
organizational bodies involved in animal health issues.  
 
The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) is another intergovernmental or-
ganization responsible for improving animal health and welfare worldwide. OIE sets 
up – independently or together with e.g. Codex Alimentarius in FAO - international 
standards, recommendations and guidelines when it comes to legislation, organiza-
tion, resources, capacities and the role of the public and private sector in the protec-
tion of all animals kept on a commercial as well as a non-commercial basis.       
  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is also involved in the protection against ani-
mal diseases through e.g. the international agreement on the application of sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures (the SPS Agreement).    
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2.3. Organization of the report  
The organization of the remainder of the report is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The overall 
aim of all chapters 3-6 is to investigate how the existing direct as well as indirect eco-
nomic incentives might be modified in order to provide livestock farmers with addi-
tional incentives for improved disease prevention in accordance with the policy objec-
tives stated in EU’s Animal Health Strategy.     
 
Figure 2.2. Organization of the report 
EU’s Animal Health Strategy 2007 - 2013
Chapter 4: 
Economic  incentives 
for animal disease 
prevention 
Chapter 3: 
Biosecurity in pig and 
cattle herds
Chapter 5: 
Compensation and 
cost-sharing schemes  
Chapter 6: 
Strategic options for 
improved prevention 
Chapter 7:
English summary with 
recommendations
 
       
 
Although all stakeholders as mentioned in section 2.2 are involved in the risk man-
agement of animal health, it is explicitly stated in the EU strategy that the main re-
sponsibility for animal health at farm level lies primarily with the farmers and collec-
tively with the industry. This means that the farmers and the industry are in a better 
position to reduce animal health risks than for example the government according to 
the strategy, (European Commission, 2007).  
 
Improved disease prevention by the individual farmer should manifest itself in the 
adoption of new biosecurity activities at the herd level. It is the reason why the biose-
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curity principles, plans and specific activities in pig and cattle herds are analyzed ra-
ther detailed in the following chapter.  
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the level of biosecurity at the herd level can be affect-
ed by direct as well as indirect economic incentives. The direct economic incentives 
seen from both a private and public perspective are explained in chapter 4. This chap-
ter also explains the existence of indirect economic incentives as a result of compen-
sation and financing schemes applied in case of specific animal disease outbreaks. 
Thus, the design of compensation and cost-sharing rules provide indirect incentives to 
farmers to ensure and enhance their biosecurity. Therefore, different compensation 
and cost-sharing schemes are compared and discussed in chapter 5.   
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide together with EU’s Animal Health Strategy the inputs to 
identify some strategic options for improvements in the on-farm biosecurity by use of 
economic incentives. The strategic options are identified and discussed in chapter 6. 
A realization of these options requires further research and development as well as 
political agreements between stakeholders in the animal health system. Therefore, 
these options can only be realized in the long run.    
 
The content of these four chapters are mainly based on qualitative descriptions, as-
sessments and evaluations. The main reason is that to our knowledge there are no 
comprehensive quantitative economic analyses of the costs and benefits of introduc-
ing new biosecurity measures at the farm level available. More quantitative 
knowledge seems to be available with respect to farmers’ behavioral responses to bi-
osecurity. Some of this knowledge is cited in the report.         
     
Chapter 7 contains an English summary with recommendations while the Danish 
summery, including the recommendations, is provided in chapter 1 of the report.     
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3. Biosecurity in pig and cattle herds 
Biosecurity is here defined as all preventive principles, plans and specific activities 
(measures) that will reduce the risk of transmission of infectious diseases. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to show that although some elements of biosecurity such as 
weather and geographic location are not easy to change, a considerable number of el-
ements are directly related to the decisions and behaviour by the farmer. Furthermore, 
it is the purpose to give a brief background of transmission routes of infections which 
will provide an understanding for the long list of activities related to biosecurity. The 
long list of relevant biosecurity activities is a very direct reason that farmers needs 
considerable motivation to instigate these activities as they are time consuming, often 
expensive and sometimes in direct conflict with other interests of the farmer such as 
going to animal shows.  
 
First, a description of possible sources of infections and routes of transmission is giv-
en. This basic understanding is followed by an outline of the possible specific activi-
ties that will reduce the risk of transmission. These activities can be seen at the inter-
national, national, sector and at the herd level. In parallel with the outline of biosecu-
rity activities some general recommendations are given. To get an impression of 
which biosecurity activities have been prioritised, a brief description and examples of 
the current legislation are given. Finally the chapter ends with examples of surveys of 
farmers’ behaviour in relation to biosecurity. The latter in order to illustrate that there 
is considerable room for improvement.  
 
It can be discussed whether vaccination is a preventive biosecurity measure or rather 
a part of a control program for an existing disease. In any case, as vaccination can 
help reducing the spread of infection it will briefly touched upon. 
3.1. Transmission of infections 
Transmission of infections can usually be seen as a continuum of excretions of agents 
(pathogens such as bacteria and virus) from infectious animals, followed by different 
modes of transmission of the agents to susceptible animals, which then becomes new 
infectious animals. Infectious animals are defined as animals shedding the disease 
agent. 
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The infectious animal (or host origin) can be divided into diseased animals or carriers. 
From a biosecurity point of view, it is an advantage that the infectious animals are 
diseased as they will be discovered and therefore tested for the particular pathogen 
(depending on how specific the clinical signs are). The so-called carrier animals, on 
the other hand, are clinically normal and may therefore go un-noticed in the popula-
tion for long periods of time.  
 
The infectious animal can be either transiently infected or to varies degrees persistent-
ly infected, which has huge impact on the epidemiological importance. In particular, 
the combination of a carrier being persistently infected has immense impact on trans-
mission. 
 
The transmission of agents from one animal to another is typically divided into hori-
zontal transmission vs. vertical transmission and direct vs. indirect transmission. The 
definitions may vary slightly in the literature, but here the definitions given by Toma 
et al. (1999) are used. Horizontal transmission is defined as “transmission of a patho-
gen from an individual hosting the agent to another individual, independent of the pa-
rental relationship of those animals”, whereas vertical transmission is defined as 
“transmission from a parent to a descendant, based on reproduction”. The distinction 
is thus in particular important for pathogens that are known to be able to transmit via 
e.g. placenta, embryos and semen.  
 
Direct transmission is defined as “passage of a pathogen from one individual to an-
other by close physical contact/proximity between individuals or by common use of 
an enclosed airspace”. This can occur e.g. when animals are touching, scratching, 
licking or biting each other. Transmission from aerosol over short distances when an-
imals are coughing is also considered as direct transmission. Airborne transmission is 
used for spread over longer distances with small particles such as droplet nuclei or 
dust. 
 
The indirect transmission is defined as “passage of a pathogen from one individual to 
another by the intermediary involvement or action of another individual, object or 
substance”. It is usually subdivided into vehicle borne or vector borne and provides a 
huge number of transmission possibilities. Thus, vehicle borne transmission can in-
clude food, bedding, equipment for handling animals, instruments, biological prod-
ucts (milk, blood, urine and semen), clothing, contaminated medical products and 
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others. The vector borne transmission involves invertebrates (flies, mosquitoes, ticks 
etc.) carrying pathogens between vertebrate hosts. 
 
Although probably never quantified, the direct transmission route is the more likely to 
occur (if the circumstances for direct transmission is there) than the indirect transmis-
sion. Thus, the indirect transmission is dependent on the ability of the pathogen to 
survive in the environment. 
 
There is a huge variation between pathogens for how long time and in which amount 
they are excreted and whether direct, indirect or airborne transmission is likely to oc-
cur. Many infected animals may after for example seroconversion not excrete the 
pathogen anymore and therefore not be infectious. Therefore, it is very important to 
distinguish between infected animals and infectious animals. In particular, for the in-
direct transmission there is huge variation in the ability of the pathogen to survive in 
the environment (from hours to years). 
 
Overall, the variation in the probability of transmission of an infection is due to the 
dependence of determinants or risk factors related to the host, the agent or the envi-
ronment (the so-called host-agent-environment-triad). Host related factors can include 
traits such as genetics, immunity, age, species and breed. For example, young animals 
will be very susceptible just after they have lost colostral immunity; and swine will 
excrete much higher amount of Foot and Mouth disease virus than cattle. Obviously, 
vaccination will affect the susceptibility of the host and hence also the excretion of 
virus. The infectious agents show variation in their ability to enter a new host, spread 
within the host and be excreted again. Furthermore, there is huge variation in its abil-
ity to survive in the environment, which, as already stated, has huge impact on indi-
rect transmission. Finally, the environmental determinants include a huge number of 
variables related to the production system, management and climate, for example 
housing density, hygienic procedures, transportation and many others. 
 
In addition to the variation of risk factors related to the host, the agent and the envi-
ronment, these factors will also interact among each other. Therefore, the transmis-
sion of infections in one population setting can be quite different from another popu-
lation setting. Thus, it is important to stress that all the following activities related to 
biosecurity can have quite different effects depending on how they are combined. 
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3.2. Specific activities related to biosecurity 
The importance of the host origin or source is thus highly dependent on the relative 
importance of direct vs. indirect transmission. If only direct transmission is likely, it 
only has implications for animals in its proximity whereas indirect transmission can 
reach a much wider spectrum of animals. This has direct implications for the biosecu-
rity activities. Dealing with infections where direct transmission is important, there is 
emphasis on activities such as animal tests and issuing certificates, avoiding transpor-
tation of animals (purchase, animal shows etc.) or using quarantine. When dealing 
with infections, where indirect transmission is likely, there is emphasis on several 
management procedures, such as avoiding sharing equipment, avoiding visitors to 
herds and implementing hygienic procedures.  
 
Avoid purchase or other movement of animals between herds 
Movement of animals is among the most important means by which direct transmis-
sion of infections will take place. Many (or most diseases) have subclinical phases 
where animals will carry the infection without showing clinical signs. Therefore, 
avoiding purchase of animals, movement of animals to markets, animal shows or 
common pasture is a very effective way of reducing the risk of transmission both at 
short and long distances. However, to many farmers these are very rigorous con-
straints and therefore it is important to consider biosecurity measures in case the ani-
mals are moved (test strategies, quarantine and others). 
 
Testing animals and issuing certificates – Buy only animals from herds with known 
status 
For many infections, there are specific tests that can assure that animals are not in-
fected. But to assure freedom it must be combined with isolation/quarantine to assure 
that the animal has not been in an incubation period. However, for many infections, 
the laboratory tests have low sensitivity (e.g. paratuberculosis) meaning that the ani-
mals cannot be tested free with a reasonably high probability. 
 
An efficient way to avoid the need for individual certificates is to buy animals from 
herds known to be free from certain infections as it is known in the Danish SPF sys-
tem for swine herds. Thus, animals should always be purchased from herds with a 
higher health status. Cattle herds do not have a similar declaration system involving 
several diseases, but have status categories for individual diseases.  
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Quarantine of animals 
As there is a time lapse between the infection and appearance of clinical signs and 
from infection until antibodies are present, animals should be quarantined between the 
herd of origin and herd of destination. The needed period depend on the individual 
infection, but will often last some weeks.  
The need for testing and use of quarantine can thus mean quite substantial extra costs 
in relation to movement of animals. 
 
Pasturing of animals 
If pasturing is used, double fencing is often recommended to avoid over the fence 
contact between neighbouring herds. This is in particular important if the infection 
status of neighbouring herds is unknown. 
 
Signs: “entrance forbidden” 
Human beings can transmit infections in several ways depending on their activities at 
the farm. 
 
An efficient means of total avoiding transmission by humans is therefore to put up 
signs with “entrance forbidden” to avoid visiting people who do not have a specific 
business on the farm. For those who have specific business on the farm (veterinarian, 
AI technician, claw trimmer and others), there should be visitor rules that they should 
be aware of and follow. 
 
For swine herds there are particular rules for quarantines before visiting another herd. 
The length of the period depends of the infection status of herd of origin and herd of 
destination. 
 
In particular, human beings having visited other countries should comply with quar-
antine rules before entering the herds.  
 
Rules for visitors (Veterinarian, AI-technician, Hoof trimmer) 
One of the larger elements is establishment an “entrance room”, where visitors 
change clothes and boots and wash their hands before entering or leaving the farm. 
 
These rules can be more or less rigoristic. Some farms for example only have a foot 
bath with disinfectant to pass before entering the stable area. 
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Furthermore, as far as possible all instruments and equipment should be available on 
the farm, so that visitors do not have to carry it between farms. For example, all kinds 
of equipment for handling animals (nose tongs, claw trimmer box and the like) can 
preferably be available on the farm. 
 
Other types of equipment like surgical instruments and medicine bottles need to be 
transported between farms. Here it is of course important to clean, disinfect and steri-
lize as far as possible. Furthermore, it is recommended only to bring the medicine bot-
tles that are needed into the stables. 
 
In some situations there are also rules for parking and cleaning of cars (for vehicles 
transporting animals). 
 
Some farmers that share equipment and machinery should be aware of the transmis-
sion via feed stuffs, manure etc. 
 
Use of biological products, medicine, embryo transfer 
If any biological products are to be used on the farm, any risk of them being contami-
nated should be taken into account. For example, the re-use of needles into the medi-
cine bottles between herds has been shown to transfer infection. 
 
Transportation - pick up for slaughter – trading of animals 
When animals are moved, not only infected animals being transported from one place 
to another pose an important risk, but also a number of other circumstances need to be 
addressed to prevent that infections are introduced to the animals being transported or 
by straw or manure being transported with the vehicle. 
 
Thus, when picking up animals for slaughter there should be delivery facilities so that 
the vehicle and driver does not come in close contact with the animals staying at the 
farm. Such a facility is also important when trading animals. 
 
In particular, when picking up animals for the rendering plant, there should be a spe-
cial place away from the farm to put dead animals. 
 
Housing and management of animals 
In relation to prevent internal transmission at the farm, it is recommended to have all-
in – all-out production where animals are reared in batches. Here all animals are re-
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moved from the stable where after it is cleaned and disinfected before new animals 
are moved in again.  
 
Also mixing of young animals with older animals should be avoided; or different age 
groups can be housed in separate buildings such as it is done in the multi-site produc-
tion of pigs. 
 
Rules concerning general farm hygiene at the farm are also important for reducing 
disease transmission in the herd, (Danish Agricultural & Food Council, 2012). 
 
Depending on the individual characteristics of the infections, there can be several rel-
evant management related biosecurity measures. For example, for some diseases co-
lostrum from infected dams should be avoided. 
 
Control of rodents and birds – and wildlife  
In general, it is recommended to have poison for rats and mice. In some cases (e.g. 
Foot and Mouth suspicion) all kind of other species (cats and dogs) should be re-
moved from the stable area. It may also be recommended that only one species is kept 
on the farm (e.g. not having pigs and cattle on the same farm). 
 
Wild boars may pose a risk for pigs housed outdoors. In such situations, the wild boar 
is said to be a reservoir host. 
 
Biosecurity measures at borders – EU borders and national borders 
Many of the biosecurity measures at the borders are in principle mentioned above. 
But the important ones are emphasized here and further described under legislation. 
Transport of living animals across borders should obviously be kept at a minimum. 
Those importing living animals or breeding animals must be registered at the veteri-
nary and food authorities. If animals are imported, quarantine is highly recommended. 
Both import and export of animals are important as transport vehicles are crossing the 
border. Therefore, washing of transport vehicles at the border is recommended.  
 
It is obviously difficult to establish biosecurity measures for infections that are air-
borne over long distances. In these situations, it is important to have early warning 
systems for assessments of threats and increase the general alertness. 
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Vaccination 
A huge variety of vaccines exists for both List 1 and List 2 diseases (see Table 4.3 in 
section 4.4). The obvious advantage is to provide animals with protective immunity, 
which can totally prevent disease or at least mean that the clinical signs will be less 
severe. A major disadvantage is that it may be very difficult to declare a herd or area 
free of infection when vaccines are used (unless for example advanced diagnostic 
tests are in place that can distinguish between antibodies induced by natural infections 
from vaccine induced antibodies). The use of vaccines can therefore exclude export 
market opportunities as freedom for infection cannot be documented. There are strict 
rules for which vaccines are allowed to use. 
 
When use of vaccines is allowed, they can be used in individual herds that are be-
lieved to have less efficient biosecurity. They can also be used at regional level to 
provide a buffer zone between infected areas and infection free areas (which has been 
used for the Foot and Mouth Disease in south-eastern part of Europe). 
3.3. Main measures in the legislation 
Both at the EU level and at the national level, there are a huge number of regulations 
involving bio-security measures. They are just briefly summarized here as this report 
has emphasis of what can motivate farmers. Therefore, the following text is non-
exhaustive. 
 
EU regulation 
EU has a number of rules for import of living animals from outside to inside the 
community. These rules include control of documents, clinical control, sampling for 
diagnostic investigations and many others. EU has a list of approved control places. 
Within EU, there are also a considerable number of biosecurity rules for control at 
primary production sites, health certificates, trading documents etc. 
 
EU and Danish legislation demands that transport vehicles must be cleaned and disin-
fected before entering a herd. 
 
EU has established the Animal Disease Notification System for the animal health sta-
tus in member states. Furthermore, a database (TRACES) has been established to rec-
ord certificates and documents in relation to the trade of animals. 
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Danish regulation 
Washing of transport vehicles at the border is not part of legislation. But DANISH 
TRANSPORTSTANDARD for swine has regulations securing that vehicles from 
other countries are washed and disinfected at an approved washing place before enter-
ing Denmark. For cattle, there is a voluntary agreement of washing and disinfection 
of vehicles at the border. 
 
Import to Denmark of animal products must only take place at approved border con-
trol places.  
 
Movement of animals (cattle and pigs) should be recorded in the Central Herd Regis-
ter (CHR). In relation to movements a certain 7/30 days rule imply that animals can-
not be moved from a herd until 7 days after there has been a movement to the herd 
and further that an animal moved to a herd cannot be removed from the herd before 
30 days later. 
 
In order to improve the biosecurity in general at herd level, there are regulations for 
biosecurity for large cattle and swine herds. The exact herd size where these rules 
must be followed is specified in the legislation. These herds must establish a biosecu-
rity plan together with the veterinarian taking care of health advice in the herd. The 
biosecurity plan must be approved by the veterinary authorities. The biosecurity plans 
include description of among other things peoples access to the herds, access for 
transport vehicles and pest control. Furthermore, there are rules for quarantine when 
moving animals to the herd and restrictions on the number of herds that there can be 
deliveries from. 
 
For many infections prophylactic vaccination is directly forbidden in the legislation. 
But for some infections (for example Foot and Mouth Disease), emergency vaccina-
tion can be allowed by the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration.  
 
Biosecurity measures for infectious diseases under eradication 
For diseases where an eradication program has been decided, there are several biose-
curity regulations, which may change considerable over time as the program is tight-
ened.  
 
As an illustration, a total of 11 BVDV government orders were issued from 1996 to 
2008. During these years, many biosecurity measures were included in the legislation 
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(Houe et al., 2008). The biosecurity measures had special focus on avoiding contact 
with persistently infected (PI) carrier animals. This control element was included at 
very different intensities in different government orders: not allowing PI animals on 
pasture, demanding them slaughtered or brought to an incinerating plant, demanding 
them isolated or demanding them killed or slaughtered on the farm. For individual an-
imals, diagnostic tests were used to establish demands for certificates before any 
movement. Later, when there were good declarations for freedom at herd level, the 
demands for individual certificates were replaced by declaration of herd status. (Bi-
osecurity measures such as indirect transmission by utensils and clothing that had less 
evidence of importance in the literature were too much lesser extent included in the 
legislation). 
 
Biosecurity measures if infectious exotic diseases are suspected 
An important part of the regulation consists of surveillance and reporting if occur-
rence of exotic diseases is suspected. Thus, this activity is a biosecurity measure that 
will prevent further spread after the infection is introduced.  
 
As further explained in section 4.4, the legislation has a so-called “List 1” with dis-
eases that upon suspicion must be reported directly to the veterinary authorities and a 
“List 2” with diseases where the practicing veterinarian upon suspicion takes samples 
for laboratory examination and contacts the veterinary authorities if the suspected in-
fection is confirmed. Until response from the laboratory, the herd is given certain re-
strictions including no transport to and from the herd.   
 
A number of infectious diseases have their own individual legislation (the Foot and 
Mouth Disease, swine fever, African swine fever, bovine virus diarrhoea virus, infec-
tious bovine rhinotracheitis and many others) with very detailed regulation of the bi-
osecurity measures. For example, herds suspected for Foot and Mouth Disease are not 
allowed to move milk, milk products, beef, beef products, feed stuffs and equipment 
etc. from the herd. 
 
National biosecurity measures after outbreak/index case 
After an index case (the first case that calls attention for the existence of an outbreak) 
of for example Foot and Mouth Disease, important biosecurity measures such as pro-
tection and surveillance zones are established. 
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The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration generally has a non-vaccination pol-
icy at an eventual disease outbreak, but emergency vaccination will be considered de-
pending on the specific circumstances of an outbreak.  
 
Rules within the industry 
As already mentioned earlier, DANISH TRANSPORTSTANDARD for swine has 
regulations securing that vehicles from other countries are washed and disinfected at 
an approved washing place before entering Denmark; and for cattle, there is a volun-
tary agreement of washing and disinfection of vehicles at the border. 
 
People entering from other countries to Denmark have a quarantine of 24 hours be-
fore entering a herd. 
 
Especially the Danish pig sector has the unique SPF system (Specific Pathogen Free) 
that ensures that SPF pig farms are free from specific swine diseases. The SPF system 
is the “world’s most comprehensive health program for pigs”, (SPF Danmark, 2012). 
Approximately 3,700 pig herds or 70 per cent of Danish sows are housed in SPF hold-
ings. In order for farmers to be SPF certified, they have to sign an agreement with 
SPF-SUS and follow certain animal health rules. These rules include protection 
against infections to ensure that diseases are not introduced to the farm, health inspec-
tion so that diseases are not spread through trade or transportation, declaration of herd 
health status and engaging in purchase and trade of health products approved by SPF-
SUS. All trade and movement of pigs are done according to their health status. Alt-
hough the salmonella level of each farm is declared in the health declaration, the SPF 
health declaration is mainly applicable to specific diseases such as Pleuropneumonia, 
ordinary pneumonia swine dysentery, atrophic rhinitis, PRRS, (SPF Danmark, 2012). 
As previously mentioned, cattle herds do not have a similar declaration system in-
volving several diseases. But for individual diseases such as Salmonella Dublin, there 
are specific status categories. This has also been used during eradication programs for 
different viruses, e.g. infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR) and bovine virus diar-
rhoea (BVD). 
3.4. Surveys of biosecurity in production herds 
A few surveys exist on the farmers’ choices and routines concerning biosecurity 
measures. Among the results from an interview among owners of 116 fattening 
swineherds (Boklund et al., 2004) were that: 
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 78 % purchased weaners from one sow herd, whereas 10% purchased from > 
5 sow herds during one year 
 Two swine herds purchased weaners from a market 
 22 % did not use an effective barrier between the loading area and the stables 
when delivering pigs for slaughter 
 The number of visitors was generally less than 10 per year 
 
In a similar study, where owners of 121 sow herds were interviewed (Boklund et al., 
2003), the results among other things showed that: 
 
 52 % sold weaners 
 71 % used delivery facilities for picking up of weaners (but half of these did 
not have a barrier between the loading area and the stable) 
 19 % of the pick-ups of weaners occurred directly from the stable 
 10 % of the pick-ups, the truck driver had access to the stable 
 48 % of the units required the vehicle to be cleaned and disinfected before 
the transport 
 16 % of the units required the vehicle to be cleaned before the transport 
 57 % of large sites used quarantine before introducing new animals to the 
herd 
 23 % of small sites used quarantine before introducing new animals to the 
herd 
 
A survey of biosecurity and management practices in 421 Belgian pig herds (Ribbens 
et al., 2008) showed among other things that: 
 
 51 % had changing room available 
 33 % had disinfection bath available 
 3.3 % allowed pigs to go outside 
 8 % fed kitchen waste 
 72 % performed insect control 
 32 % had separated veterinary material available between different pens or 
compartments  
 
These results are very important in order to identify areas where biosecurity can and 
must be improved. 
28     
 
Another way to identify critical points of lack of biosecurity is to perform follow-up 
activities in recently infected herds. For example, follow-up investigations in 67 pre-
viously BVDV-free Danish herds identified obvious explanations for re-infection in 
74 per cent of the cases (Bitsch et al., 2000). These investigations revealed severe 
flaws in important biosecurity measures. Thus, among the 67 herds: 
 
 28 % had purchased pregnant animals that later delivered PI animals 
 36 % of the herds, PI animals had been present on neighbouring pastures  
 7 % of the herds had animals on common pasture 
 3 % of the herds there had been PI animals in neighbouring farmhouses  
 26 % of the remaining herds, no obvious explanations could be identified  
 
These surveys show that there are several places where biosecurity can be improved. 
It is therefore relevant to e.g. interview farmers in order to understand the barriers for 
implementing different biosecurity measures. A study on Danish dairy farmers’ per-
ception of biosecurity showed that it is a big challenge to motivate farmers to comply 
with biosecurity rules. Thus, back in 2008 farmers with large herds must according to 
the legislation have developed a farm-specific biosecurity plan. However, one year 
later none of the farmers in the study had complied with this rule (Kristensen and 
Jakobsen, 2011). The authors therefore conclude that it is important to provide farm-
ers with incentives to improve biosecurity at the herd level. 
 
Discussion/conclusions 
There are a considerable number of transmission routes, which varies considerably 
among infectious diseases. Therefore, also a considerable number of activities of rel-
evance to biosecurity can be listed. But the relative importance of each of these activi-
ties (or measures) is very difficult to quantify from the available literature as the ef-
fect of a biosecurity measure may depend on other measures and the population set-
ting in general. It is therefore not possible to say exactly when a set of biosecurity 
measures is enough or when it is ‘overkill’. It can be discussed that maybe the best 
one can do, is to take the gross list of biosecurity measures and try to fulfil as many as 
possible and that the minimum list of requirements needs to be a judgement for the 
individual diseases. 
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4. Economic incentives for disease prevention    
This chapter provides an introduction to an understanding of the economic incentives 
– or lack of economic incentives – for disease prevention in livestock production. 
Without such an understanding, it is impossible to discuss economic options to in-
crease farmers’ incentives to improve their preventive efforts. Section 4.1 describes 
the role of private and public incentives whereas the general requirements to an insur-
ance system for animal diseases are outlined in section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes the 
level of efficient prevention efforts from three different perspectives while section 4.4 
explains the relationship between incentives and the categorization of animal diseases 
in the legislation.  
4.1. The role of private and public incentives   
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that professional livestock farmers un-
der normal conditions, i.e. in peace time, have obvious economic incentives to pre-
vent the introduction of diseases into their herds. These economic incentives are loss 
of profit or loss of asset value. Thus, if animals are diseased their productivity may 
decrease, e.g. lower milk yield per cow or less meat per unit of feed intake; and the 
product quality may deteriorate, i.e. lower sale price; and the vet costs for disease 
treatment may increase. Lower productivity, lower product quality and higher vet 
costs all contribute to reduced profit. In addition, if animals die because of diseases, 
asset values are lost and the farmer loose wealth. Therefore, livestock farmers have 
generally speaking clear private incentives to prevent animal diseases. 
 
From section 2.2 it is also clear that the government – represented by e.g. DVFA - has 
a large number of incentives to keep as high disease-free status as possible in the live-
stock sector in order to protect the trade and export of animals and animal products, 
the employment in the food industry, the public health and protect many other bene-
fits from having healthy animals. In economics, these benefits are in general called 
public goods. The most important characteristic of a public good is that the benefit to 
one person does not preclude that other persons may enjoy the same benefit. In prin-
ciple, all citizens in a society might benefit from disease free animals. In other words, 
there is non-rivalry among people in benefiting.     
  
The problem is that there is not necessarily any compatibility between farmers’ eco-
nomic incentives and the government’s incentives to ensure animal health. For exam-
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ple, many farmers may consider the risk of getting infected with Foot and Mouth Dis-
ease or other contagious diseases as so low that this risk should be ignored. Thus, the 
individual farmer has no real incentive to invest in the prevention of such diseases. 
The expected benefit of the investment is considered low, because of the very low 
probability of occurrence, while the cost is incurred for sure.    
      
However, from a governmental perspective the risk of an outbreak of e.g. Foot and 
Mouth Disease might be considered as much higher. The reason is that the govern-
ment has to consider the risk of an outbreak for the entire livestock sector which in-
cludes all animal producers. And if an epidemic outbreak occurs, there is a high risk 
that many of the benefits of a disease-free status, which we have called public goods, 
may either disappear or be significantly reduced. For example, trade of animals and 
animal products can be prohibited, export markets closed and consumer confidence 
decline. Therefore, from a public perspective farmers’ private incentives may lead to 
an under investment in disease prevention.    
 
The explanation of the argument for the under provision of prevention efforts by pri-
vate farmers is graphically illustrated in Figure 4.1 (see Lansink (2011) for a similar 
analysis of the provision of plant health). In the Figure, the efforts to prevent animal 
diseases are measured on the horizontal axis whereas the benefits as well as the costs 
of the prevention efforts are measured on the vertical axis. Thus, we are considering a 
cost-benefit analysis of efforts into animal disease prevention.  
 
In the Figure, the MC curve shows the marginal costs of additional preventive efforts. 
Examples of marginal costs could be the cost of investing in additional hygiene 
measures, the cost of establishing a new quarantine section, or the cost associated 
with less trade of animals. The MC curve is depicted as an upward increasing with 
increasing slope indicating that the marginal costs increase as the amount of preven-
tive efforts increase. Thus, the first efforts are assumed less costly to implement than 
later preventive efforts. 
 
MBprivate and MBtotal in Figure 4.1 show the marginal private benefits and marginal 
total benefits, respectively, related to enhanced disease prevention. Examples of mar-
ginal private benefits are less sick animals and price premiums for animals with an 
extraordinary high health status (as in e.g. the Danish SPF system). Marginal total 
benefits on the other hand not only include marginal private benefits, but also margin-
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al public benefits. As mentioned above are easier access to export markets and in-
creased consumer confidence examples of public benefits.    
 
Figure 4.1. The under provision of disease prevention 
Benefits (B) and Costs (C)
MC
MBtotal =  MBprivate + MBpublic
Efforts (E)
MBprivate
EtotalEprivate
Btotal
Bprivate
 
 
 
However, both the marginal private and marginal total benefits are assumed to decline 
as the level of efforts into disease prevention is increasing. It is a standard hypothesis 
in economics that as you get more and more of the same good, your utility of the 
marginal good will decline. It is the same with respect to disease prevention. If the 
farmer changes his behavior from none to five times hand washing every day, the in-
crease in benefits may be rather high. However, if the farmer increases his hand wash-
ing from 20 to 25 times each day the enhanced benefits in the form of better preven-
tion is probably rather small.      
  
The Figure shows that a rational farmer has the incentive to produce a level of animal 
disease prevention corresponding to level Bprivate. From a rational farmer’s perspective 
this is considered as the optimal level as it depicts a cost-benefit ratio where the mar-
ginal private benefits equal marginal costs. Obviously, if the farmer increases his pre-
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ventive efforts beyond that level the additional cost will exceed the extra benefit re-
sulting in an economic loss.    
  
However, exactly because of the before mentioned public good characteristics associ-
ated with animal health (and welfare) the marginal total benefits will be higher than 
the marginal private benefits as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Thus, from a societal point of 
view the optimal level of animal health is (Btotal, Etotal) as this is the aggregated pre-
vention level where the marginal costs equal the total marginal benefits.  
 
To sum up: Figure 4.1 shows that the private optimal level of disease prevention – 
which is (Bprivate, Eprivate) – is different from the total (social) optimum - which is (Bto-
tal, Etotal) in the Figure. In the jargon of economics a market failure exists. A market 
failure exists when the market in itself cannot ensure that the private and social opti-
mums are coincident.          
 
The size of public benefits is measured by the distance Btotal – Bprivate whereas the pub-
lic costs are measured by the distance Etotal – Eprivate in Figure 4.1. There seems to be 
little disagreement that the government should be involved in the risk management of 
animal diseases as there are clearly public benefits associated with disease prevention 
in agriculture. However, disagreement arises when it comes to measure the size of 
these public benefits and therefore the costs that should be financed as public expend-
itures.    
 
The problem is that in reality it is not possible to disentangle private goods from pub-
lic goods in the provision of animal health. In fact most such goods are a mixture of 
private and public goods. For example, when a farmer improves his biosecurity, he 
not only reduces his own risk of introducing a new disease in his herd, but he also re-
duces the risk e.g. on other farms with animals. The reason is that most disease risks 
are not independent between producers. Correlated risks are also called systemic risks 
and the positive benefits that a farmer produces to other farmers (and maybe other 
stakeholders) by investing in extra disease prevention are called positive externalities. 
Externalities are another economic concept describing how private actions in produc-
tion or consumption affect others that are not directly involved in these actions.       
    
Also public goods might include elements of private benefits. Consumer confidence 
in food products is a well-known example of a public good. Most citizens are also 
consumers and may benefit from a high trust in the food sold. However, the individu-
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al farmer benefits as well since it is easier to sell his products in a market with high 
consumer confidence; and perhaps he will receive a higher price on his products sold. 
Thus, it may be argued that farmers should partly pay for the investments in building 
a positive reputation of the produced food.       
 
To conclude, it is not a simple task to provide farmers with new economic incentives 
for improved animal health management. Efficient farmers have optimized their pro-
duction decisions according to the prevailing price and market conditions. Therefore, 
any new legal animal health requirements might for sure result in new production 
costs to livestock farmers while the benefits of additional efforts into disease preven-
tion are shared among all stakeholders described in section 2.2. 
4.2. General requirements for animal disease insurance schemes  
To summarize the above discussion on the incentive issues, we present in Table 4.1 
the following short checklist for designing good overall schemes for animal disease 
insurance adopted from Meuwissen et al. (2006). 
 
Table 4.1. Important aspects of farmers’ behavior and incentives for animal 
 disease prevention   
Behavioral aspects Insurance contractual incentives Insurance organizational incentives
Risk prevention Risk classification with strong price 
discrimination
Deductibles, but only for consequential 
losses
Advance payments in combination with 
additional assessments
Additional assessments also apply to farmers 
who quit farming after an epidemic
Annual retention for insurance pool 
Local organization
Sector organization
Mutual insurance company
No possibility to purchase insurance if 
epidemics occur in close proximity 
Rapid disclosure No compensation of sick and dead animals 
Full compensation of healthy animals
Obligatory insurance for direct losses 
Compliance with 
movement standstill
Insurance coverage for losses from 
movement standstills and emergency 
vaccination
Link between risk classification and 
governmental penalty system 
No deliberate 
infection
Compensation at the lowest value of cost of 
production and market price
Source: Table 10.1. in Meuwissen et al. (2006) 
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In order to induce risk preventing behavior among the farmers it is necessary to make 
a risk classification of livestock farms and to let this classification be the basis for 
price discrimination. The risk classification should primarily be based on factors that 
the farmer can actually influence (such as factors related to hygiene, purchase of ani-
mals and other movements of animals as described in chapter 3), but it may also in-
volve factors such as farm type and geographical location which can be considered as 
fixed in the short run. It is further recommended to let these factors be transparent and 
simple to monitor in order to minimize transaction costs of all involved parties. In 
practice, these transaction costs may often be substantial.  
 
As in any type of insurance contract, deductibles play a role to reduce moral hazard 
issues. By introducing deductibles the farmers are in effect made coinsurers (in the 
same boat, so to speak, as the insurer) and therefore have incentive to reduce their 
risks. The literature recommends that deductibles are related to consequential losses 
only since deductibles on direct losses from culled animals may reduce farmers’ in-
centives for rapid disclosure.  
 
Timing of premium payments made by farmers also matters. On the one hand, pay-
ment in advance of an outbreak increases awareness of the cost of the disease risk that 
farmers face. On the other hand, payment in advance also introduces moral hazard is-
sues as they already have paid the insurance premium. Hence, it is typically recom-
mended that a relevant insurance scheme should contain some sort of combination of 
parts paid in advance and later additional payments. However, it is not obvious 
whether payment discrimination should take place when farmers pay in advance or 
when they are reimbursed ex-post.   
 
To provide incentives for rapid disclosure, it is recommended that farmers don’t re-
ceive compensation for sick and dead animals but receives full compensation for 
healthy animals. Clearly this should have the effect of early reporting by the farmer in 
order to minimize the loss from dead and infected animals. 
 
To make sure that farmers do not have incentives to move their animals out of stand-
still zones after a disease outbreak it is important that farmers are also compensated 
for losses within these zones. The compensation in infected zones should be suffi-
ciently low in order to decrease incentives to move animals into infected zones. This 
can be achieved by making sure that compensation in infected zones does not exceed 
the minimum of the production costs and the market price of the animals. Moreover, 
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it is typically recommended that vaccination programs and suitable penalty systems 
are added to compensation in standstill zones in order to decrease incentives for mov-
ing animals into healthy zones.   
 
Another issue is whether an insurance scheme with public involvement should be 
voluntary or mandatory for the livestock farmers. With a voluntary scheme there is a 
risk of the problem called adverse selection. The problem associated with adverse se-
lection is that only high risk farmers will join the insurance scheme as farmers with 
low disease risks find it too costly to join the scheme. Thus, the premium payments 
may constantly increasing driving out more and more farmers with less than average 
risks. This indicates that the scheme should be based on mandatory participation of 
the livestock keepers.       
4.3. Efficient prevention 
There are many reasons why farmers do not necessarily obtain the efficient level of 
disease prevention. A prominent one being moral hazard issues as discussed above 
where wrong incentives will stand in the way of efficiency. But it is important to be 
aware that less sophisticated explanations can be found as well and that these also (at 
least indirectly) relate to the overall design of the insurance system.   
 
In Figure 4.2 below, we try to illustrate this by mapping producer’s prevention costs 
against the level of obtained disease prevention. Three possible frontiers are in play: 
The (inner) compliance frontier represents the situation where farmers fully comply 
with biosecurity regulation and abstain from opportunistic behavior following from 
the presence of asymmetric information – that is, “Area I” in the Figure represents the 
inefficiency caused by moral hazard issues. To force producers to the efficient com-
pliance frontier, possible tools are control (monitoring) in connection with various 
forms of enforcement (penalty systems). Obviously, control and enforcement are cost-
ly solutions – it would be better if the insurance system was designed such that the 
producers themselves chose to comply with biosecurity rules; that is, if the system by 
itself induces the right incentives. This is where the considerations concerning opti-
mal design in section 4.2 above come into the picture. Careful design of the insurance 
system can potentially limit the inefficiencies from moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion. 
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Figure 4.2. Three different disease prevention frontiers     
Disease prevention 
Potential 
frontier
Best practice
frontier 
Compliance 
frontier
Prevention 
costs
Area I
Area II
Area III
 
 
 
The best practice frontier adds a further layer of potential inefficiency in the sense of 
technical inefficiency in the “production” of disease prevention. Even if the farmer is 
in full compliance with biosecurity regulation and do not engage in opportunistic be-
havior there may still remain inefficiencies due to lack of knowledge or obsolete 
technological possibilities. This emphasizes that biosecurity rules should be easy to 
understand and related procedures easy to execute. Ways to combat this form of inef-
ficiencies include better information, learning and knowledge sharing among farmers.  
 
Finally, the (outer) potential frontier represents what can be obtained if farmers are 
innovative and dares to think in new ways of organizing production processes. The 
inefficiency represented by “Area III” is therefore caused by risk-aversion among the 
farmers in the sense that “gambling” on new technological solutions always involves 
uncertainties about future costs and profits. Such uncertainties often stand in the way 
of innovation. It is important that the insurance system induces the farmers to be in-
novative in their production processes with respect to improved animal health and 
welfare.   
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We summarize this description in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2. Different categories of behavioural inefficiencies in animal dis-
 ease management   
 
Frontier Inefficiency Cause Effect Incentive scheme 
     
Potential  Area III Risk-aversion Lack of innovation Risk-/cost sharing 
Best-practice Area II Behavioral in- 
efficiencies  
High variation in  
performance  
Learning/knowledge 
sharing 
Compliance Area I Asymmetric information Opportunistic behavior Control/punishment  
4.4. Incentives and categorization of diseases  
The categorization of livestock diseases serves as an important policy instrument. It 
classifies animal diseases according to different criteria such as contagiousness, im-
pact on public health and potential economic losses to the society as a whole; defines 
the diseases which requires early disclosure in case of disease suspicion; and deter-
mines the diseases for which livestock farmers may be more or less publicly compen-
sated in case of a disease outbreak. Thus, such a classification determines to a large 
extent the role and responsibility of public authorities in periods of a disease suspi-
cion or outbreak.   
 
However, it should also be acknowledged that a categorization of animal diseases in 
the legislation may provide farmers with both incentives and disincentives to make 
preventive actions in their herds in peace time. The causal chain is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.3. The Figure shows how animal diseases included in the categorization partly 
determine the indemnification payments and how these indemnification payments in 
turn partly determine farmers’ incentives to prevent diseases in their herds. On the 
one hand, if farmers are compensated 100 per cent or more in case of an outbreak, 
they don’t have any economic incentive to take responsibility for the biosecurity 
among the animals. On the other hand, if the farmer is not compensated at all in any 
case of a disease outbreak, he doesn’t have any economic incentive to make an early 
disclosure of a suspected disease in his herd. On the contrary, the farmer may have an 
economic incentive to hide the suspicion for others and sell as much of his animals 
and animal products as possible at normal sale prices. It clearly shows the potential 
conflict between competing public and private incentives.    
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Figure 4.3. The link between categorized diseases, indemnification pay-
 ments and incentives (and disincentives) 
 
Categorized diseases  Outbreak indemnification payments  Livestock farmers’ incentives 
 
 
Early disclosure (and indemnification payments) is based on defining certain animal 
diseases as “notifiable diseases”. These are animal diseases that when suspected by 
farmers, authorities, vets or laboratories must be reported within a defined timeframe.      
 
In Denmark, The Danish Animal Health Act of 2004 forms the legislative basis for 
the notification procedure and the notifiable animal diseases. The notifiable animal 
diseases are listed in Order No. 54 of 26/01/2011 where they are divided into List 1 
diseases and List 2 diseases. The diseases included on List 1 and List 2 for multiple 
species diseases as well as for cattle and pigs are shown in Table 4.3.   
 
Table 4.3. Animal diseases on List 1 and List 2 in the Danish law 
    
 Multiple species diseases  Cattle Pigs 
List 1 diseases Bluetongue 
Brucellosis 
Japanese encephalitis 
Foot and Mouth disease  
Rabies  
Rift valley fever 
Bovin spongiform encephalo-
pati (BSE)   
Tuberculosis  
Vesicular stomatitis 
West Nile Fever 
Rinderpest 
Lumpy skin disease 
Contagious bovine  
pleuropneumonia (CBPP) 
 
 
African swine fever 
Classic swine fever 
Nipah virus encephalitis 
Swine viscular disease 
(SVD) 
Teschen disease  
List 2 diseases  Aujeszky’s disease 
Echincoccusmultilocularis 
Hydatidose 
Leptospirose 
Salmonella 
Trichinellosis 
Bovine virus diarrhea (BVD) 
Enzootic bovine leucosis 
Infectious bovine rhinotra-
cheitis/pustular vulvovagini-
tis (IBR/IPV) 
Q-fever  
 
Cysticercus cellulosae  
Transmissible gastroen-
teritis (TGE) 
Porcine respiratory and 
reproductive syndrome 
(PRRS) 
 
Source: Order No. 54 of 26/01/2011.  
 
 
List 1 diseases comprise transmissible diseases with potential for very serious and 
rapid spread, having serious socio-economic public health effects and being essential 
in the international trade of animals and animal products. These include among others 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Bluetongue and Rift Valley Fever. List 2 diseases 
include transmissible diseases with mainly production economic consequences such 
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as Aujeszky’s disease, Salmonella, Enzootic Bovine Leucosis and Porcine Respirato-
ry and Reproductive Syndrome (PRRS).  List 1 diseases are usually more serious than 
List 2 diseases due to the wider economic consequences for the whole society.  
 
Suspicion of a disease on List 1 shall immediately be notified to the Danish Veteri-
nary and Food Administration, whereas notification of a disease on List 2 is only 
mandatory after confirmation of the disease, DVFA (2012). The Danish List 1 notifi-
able diseases include all former OIE List A diseases as well as several zoonotic dis-
eases. 
 
In accordance with the Animal Health Act, a farmer is obliged to immediately call a 
veterinarian if the farmer suspects a notifiable disease. The veterinarian shall immedi-
ately notify the Regional Veterinary and Food Administration (RVFA) if the veteri-
narian suspects a disease on List 1. A veterinary officer from the RVFA will inspect 
the farm within four hours and inform the DVFA about the suspicion. If the veteri-
nary officer cannot rule out the suspicion of a List 1 disease the farm is placed under 
official surveillance and test material is collected and dispatched to the National Vet-
erinary Institute, the Technical University of Denmark. 
 
Table 4.4. A comparison of number of BSE and BT disease outbreaks in se-
 lected EU countries 
        
Country Disease 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals  
Denmark  BSE 
 
BT 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
0 
 
15 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
1 
 
16 
Netherlands BSE 
 
BT 
2 
 
456 
2 
 
5798 
1 
 
66 
0 
 
2 
2 
 
0 
7 
 
6322 
Germany BSE 
 
BT 
16 
 
885 
4 
 
20669 
2 
 
2605 
2 
 
142 
0 
 
0 
24 
 
24301 
United Kingdom BSE 
 
BT 
132 
 
0 
65 
 
65 
41 
 
70 
12 
 
0 
11 
 
0 
261 
 
135 
Sweden BSE 
 
BT 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
28 
0 
 
2 
0 
 
0 
1 
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BSE: Bovine spongiform encephalopathy; BT: Bluetongue  
Sources: European Union Animal Disease System Annual reports 2006-2010  
 
 
As shown in Table 4.4, Denmark has relatively low numbers of animal disease out-
breaks in comparison to other countries with similar production systems. The country 
is free of many major animal diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease, Aujeszky’s 
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disease and Brucelossis. The last outbreak of Classical Swine Fever in Denmark was 
in 1933, last occurrence of Foot and Mouth Disease was in 1983, the last outbreak of 
Newcastle Disease was in 2005 and the only outbreak of highly Pathogenic Avian In-
fluenza was in 2006, (DVFA, 2012).  
 
The conclusion is that the design of the indemnification payment scheme which is 
used in case of a disease outbreak may contain positive and/or negative incentives to 
prevent epidemic diseases in the herd. As shown by the low number of disease out-
breaks in Table 4.4 there is a high chance that the individual farmer underestimates 
the risk of getting serious animal diseases and therefore reduce his preventive efforts. 
It is a fundamental problem that emphasizes the need to provide farmers with more 
clear economic incentives for disease prevention in their herds.       
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5. Compensation and cost-sharing schemes   
As argued in section 4.2, the design of the livestock compensation and cost-sharing 
schemes which are established to compensate farmers in case of a serious disease 
outbreak may also have significant effects on the farmers’ incentives to take actions 
to improve their animal disease prevention in peace time.  
 
This section describes the current compensation and cost-sharing schemes for live-
stock farmers in Denmark, The Netherlands and Germany which include public in-
volvement. The compensation and financing arrangements in the Netherlands and 
Germany are included to compare incentives (and disincentives) in these schemes 
against the incentives embedded in the Danish compensation system. Statutory live-
stock compensation and cost-sharing schemes vary greatly among the countries in 
EU. However, most of the schemes cover the loss of animal more or less in case of an 
outbreak whereas other interruption costs often are covered by private insurance 
schemes. These private schemes are not considered in what follows.   
    
Before describing the specific compensation schemes in Denmark, The Netherlands 
and Germany, it is appropriate to define the costs that might be associated with an ep-
idemic disease outbreak. An overview of the costs makes it easier to see which costs 
are compensated and which are not covered in case of a disease outbreak. These costs 
may be categorized in alternative ways as shown in e.g. FCEC (2006: 75) and Van 
Asseldonk et al. (2006: 155 ff.).     
5.1. Categorization of disease outbreak costs 
Here it is chosen to categorize the costs into direct and indirect costs at the farm, sec-
tor and national level as shown in Table 5.1. The costs categorization might not be 
exhaustive, but the idea is to show the most important outbreak costs. At the farm 
level the main direct costs are the value of the destroyed animals and the consequen-
tial costs, respectively. The indirect business costs are mainly resulting from market 
interruptions due to a disease outbreak.  
 
The affected agricultural sector or sectors may experience costs from a lower sale of 
products both on export markets as well on domestic markets (shown as negative 
market and price effects in the table). The lower sale can be understood as a cost 
when the sale during an outbreak is compared to the normal sale in peace time. A re-
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cent research project analyzing the economic consequences of an outbreak of Foot 
and Mouth Disease (FDM) in Denmark has shown that the costs of lost export may be 
more than 90 per cent of all the outbreak costs
1
. Many other studies confirm that the 
negative market and price effects associated with a disease outbreak may be more 
costly than the direct costs of lost animals and the consequential losses.  
 
Table 5.1. Examples of direct and indirect costs in case of an epidemic dis-
 ease outbreak    
   
 Direct costs Indirect costs  
Business level  Costs of the animals destroyed in in-
fected and contact herds, including the 
value of animals and slaughter, ren-
dering, disinfection and cleaning costs  
 
Costs of pre-emptive welfare slaughter 
of animals 
 
Consequential losses can compromise 
one or more of the following costs cat-
egories: 
Business interruption costs because 
farm buildings are becoming more or 
less empty for a certain period etc. 
Costs related to established re-
strictions zones, e.g. extra feeding 
costs, costs of additional hygienic 
measures and extra transportation 
costs 
Costs from emergency vaccination            
Negative market and price effects due 
to restrictions on trade of animals and 
animal products and less consumer 
demand of especially dairy and meat 
products 
Sector level Costs of reduced export to other mar-
kets which are closed 
 
Costs of increased unemployment in 
the whole supply chain as well as oth-
er industry costs, e.g. excess slaugh-
ter capacity       
The competiveness of the affected ag-
ricultural sectors may deteriorate as 
other competitors take over the mar-
kets  
 
Reputational costs as consumers loss 
confidence in the affected products      
National level  Indemnification costs financed by the 
government 
 
Costs associated with implementing in 
the veterinary operational prepared-
ness, e.g. establish and monitor re-
striction zones  
The gross national product may be 
negatively affected  
 
Increased costs to ensure public 
health   
 
 
Loss of competiveness and reduced reputation are seen as two examples of indirect 
costs at the sector level. National costs are the costs of implementing the operational 
                                                        
 
1 See the project website: www.vet.dtu.dk/English/Research/Projects/FMDSIM.aspx 
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procedures of the veterinary contingency preparedness for a timely and efficient man-
agement of a disease outbreak as well as the costs associated with the public financed 
compensation payments to the affected farmers. According to Van Asseldonk et al. 
(2006: 117) refunds the veterinary budget of EU in most cases 50 per cent of the 
compulsory and pre-emptive slaughter, 70 per cent of the costs of welfare slaughter 
and 50 per cent of the costs of organization.    
 
Indirect costs at the national level might for example be increased costs to protect 
public health. Table 5.1 clearly shows that the costs are increased for many different 
stakeholders in case of a disease outbreak. An English study, cited from FCEC (2006: 
25ff.), shows that the total cost of the FMD crisis in the United Kingdom has been 
13,594 million euros. Of this amount the 7,799 million euros or 57 per cent were eco-
nomic losses to the tourism industry in the country.              
 
It is important to recognize that Table 5.1 only shows the potential costs when a seri-
ous disease outbreak has occurred. Thus, either the costs to disease prevention and 
contingency planning in peace time or the costs to diagnostics etc. in the period of a 
suspicious of an infectious animal disease outbreak are included in the Table.      
5.2. The Danish case
2
 
In Denmark, infectious animal diseases included in List 1 (see section 4.4) are so se-
rious that the Government compensates the outbreak losses in accordance with the 
rules described in Order 239 of 12/04/1991 and Order 812 of 29/10/1999, whereas no 
public compensation is automatically provided for diseases on the List 2. However, in 
some cases diseases on List 2 are handled approximately in the same manner as List 1 
diseases. 
The costs paid by the Government in case of an outbreak, where combating is de-
manded by the veterinary authorities, are: 
 
 indemnities for animals ordered slaughtered    
 indemnities for feedstuff, eggs, milk etc. that are public ordered destroyed  
 indemnities for 20 per cent of the affected farmers’ consequential economic 
losses    
                                                        
 
2 This section is mainly based on unpublished documents although some information about the Dan-
ish schemes might be found in Koontz et al. (2006). 
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 for diseases related to List 1 diseases, the Government also covers the following 
costs: 
- samples that are collected in case of a suspicion or after an outbreak of a dis-
ease 
- destruction and rendering of the animals  
- cleaning and disinfection of the infected farms 
- other costs ordered as part of the combat of the infectious disease   
 for diseases related to List 2 diseases, the Government covers the following 
costs: 
- samples that are collected in case of a suspicion of an infectious disease  
 
One of the largest costs in the event of an infectious outbreak is the cost to clean and 
disinfect the affected farms. Two elements are included in this cost. The first is the 
cleaning and disinfection cost used to enclose the further transmission of the infec-
tion. Secondly, the other element is the cost to bring the farm back to a level of biose-
curity where it can again produce and trade at normal conditions. The cost to clean 
and disinfect in this second step is highly dependent on the maintenance level of the 
buildings, equipment etc. on the farm as well as the attitudes and behavior of the 
farmer.       
 
The Danish compensation and financing schemes are shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
The public indemnities and related costs are financed as a separate account on the 
Danish state budget. As it is a statutory account, it is possible for the Danish Veteri-
nary and Food Administration to use the account without any upper limits in case of 
an outbreak emergency. For costs related to specific diseases and activities in combat-
ing an outbreak the Danish Government may be reimbursed from the EU. In 2012, the 
EU co-finances surveillance programs for TSE (BSE and Scrapie), Bluetongue and 
Avian Influenza.  
 
45 
Figure 5.1. The Danish compensation and financing schemed with public in-
 volvement 
The Danish 
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Food 
Administration
Production 
levy
funds
Farmers
Danish State budget 
Directly affected farmers are reimbursed
80 per cent of the consequential losses 
Pays costs of culling,
disinfection, rendering etc. 
ordered by the 
Ministry
In addition, pays 20 % of 
the consequential costs
Ministry of
Food, 
Agriculture 
and
Fisheries 
Legal fram
e
w
o
rk
All farmers pay
these levies
EU co-financing
 
 
Source: Based on inspiration from FCEC (2006).  
 
 
Concerning indemnities to farmers for the remaining the 80 per cent of the conse-
quential losses, which are not covered by the Government in case of a List 1 disease, 
these may be financed by the production levy funds that have been established in 
Danish agriculture. Today, there are in total 14 production levy funds, which is one 
for each agricultural sector that collect levies (and including one special per mille 
levy fund covering the whole agriculture that is not considered in the report). All 
farmers in each of the 13 sectors pay a levy according to the amount of agricultural 
products sold. Thus, the production levy paid is proportional to the amount sold from 
the farm.      
 
Each production levy fund is governed by a board with public as well as commercial 
representatives that are appointed by the Minister of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. 
The boards are independent and have the authority to make their own decisions within 
the constituted legal framework. In the area of animal disease prevention, eradication 
and control, it is possible for the board to support activities of public interest such as 
activities concerning zoonotic diseases, Avian Influenza and Newcastle disease. Fur-
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thermore, the legislation makes it possible for the production levy funds to pay in-
demnifies to affected farmers in case of specific animal disease outbreaks.   
 
Positive incentives 
During peacetime, the Danish compensation and financing schemes provide some in-
centives for farmers to disclosure of suspicions of an infectious animal disease.  
 
Furthermore, in the event of a List 1 disease outbreak the current schemes ensure a 
safety net for livestock producers. Farmers’ compensation for the direct and some in-
direct costs associated with such a disease outbreak ensure that their incomes are not 
grossly affected by the outbreak.  
 
Negative incentives 
There are a number of potential disincentives embedded in the existing compensation 
and financing schemes both during peacetime, during periods of suspicions and in pe-
riods of actual outbreaks. 
  
In peacetime, the schemes do not really provide any incentives to farmers for early 
disclosure of a suspicion of an infectious disease. One reason is that the farmer cannot 
be sure that the suspicion is related to a List 1 disease. If it is not a List 1 disease, the 
farmer may receive no economic compensation. Another reason is all the restrictions 
that are made on the production and trading activities in case of a suspicion. Even if 
the suspicion is shown to be false, the farmer might still have high costs due to e.g. 
loss of trading partners.    
   
Furthermore, in peacetime (as well as in periods of suspicions and outbreaks) there 
seems to be only weak incentives for ensuring “Good Agricultural Practice” in order 
to minimize the losses and costs associated with an outbreak. For example, the Gov-
ernment covers all the cleaning and disinfection costs if the herd is infected with a 
List 1 disease which is reducing (i.e. crowding-out) farmers’ incentives to ensure a 
good maintenance of farm buildings and equipment. In fact, for these diseases the 
farmer has no economic incentives for doing any prevention above the minimum re-
quirements stated in the legislation.  
 
After an infectious disease outbreak has occurred, the potential disincentives depend-
ent on whether the livestock farmer is affected directly or indirectly. If the farmer is 
directly affected by having the List 1 disease in his herd, the farmer seems to have the 
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right incentives to disclosure the disease. The disincentives are much more obvious 
for livestock farmers that are indirectly affected by being e.g. located in protection 
and surveillance zones. The Danish schemes don’t provide these farmers with any 
compensation although they might incur significant costs due to e.g. no allowance of 
trading and other movements of animals. In reality, some of these indirectly affected 
farmers might be better of economically by having the disease in their herds. This is a 
huge disincentive problem that is not properly handled by the current Danish 
schemes.       
5.3. Case I: The Netherlands
3
 
In the Netherlands, there exists both a private - public collaboration dealing with epi-
demic animal diseases and private insurance products that cover other related live-
stock risks. The private-public collaboration has led to the establishment of the Ani-
mal Health Fund. The compensation and financing schemes with public involvement 
in the Netherlands are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The Animal Health Fund is closely 
related to the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (in the following re-
ferred to as the Ministry or the Government) as shown in the Figure.         
         
In case of a disease outbreak, the Ministry uses the Animal Health Fund to pre financ-
es payments involved in indemnification and other related costs to farmers as pre-
scribed in the legislation. The Fund covers costs such as culling, rendering, disinfec-
tion, and also vaccination and other prevention measures in case of specific disease 
emergencies. Afterwards the Ministry then invoices most of these expenses to a Prod-
uct Board. The Product Board is also obligated to reimburse some other costs related 
to e.g. diagnostics of animal diseases and mandatory monitoring programs. The reim-
bursement by the Product Board is financed primarily by using own reserves and 
bank-guarantees and secondly by imposing levies on livestock farmers.  
 
However, the Product Board only refunds the Ministry up to a certain pre-determined 
ceiling. Above this ceiling, the Government fully pays the rest. The ceiling for differ-
ent animal sectors (as well as the maximum contribution for different diseases) is 
reached through negotiations between the Ministry and farmer representatives. The 
amount contributed by each subsector (to the Animal Health Fund) is dependent on 
the type of production and e.g. the need for refinancing the Fund due to previous out-
                                                        
 
3 This section is mainly based on section 4.2 in FCEC (2006: 40 ff.).    
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breaks. The levies are proportional to the level of production, e.g. the milk delivered 
and pigs and cattle slaughtered. Thus, levies paid by farmers are not differentiated ac-
cording to individual farm and/or production risks. However, as only the direct costs 
of culling, rendering etc., but not the consequential economic losses, are covered by 
the scheme, the Dutch farmers might still have incentives to take preventive actions.        
 
Figure 5.2. The Netherlands’ compensation and financing schemes with 
 public involvement 
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Agriculture
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and combat measures)
All farmers pay
specific levies
 
 
Source: FCEC (2006: 41). 
 
 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the Product Board covers the whole supply chain and it exists 
for a number of livestock industries. Three Product Boards are relevant with respect 
to the Animal Health Fund. In specific areas a Product Board is authorized to make 
statutory rules. Although the Product Board covers the costs by financing the Animal 
Health Fund (up to pre-specified limits), it is mainly the Ministry that makes the deci-
sions about culling, rendering, disinfection and prevention in case of an outbreak. 
Thus, the Product Board makes the decisions about preventive actions, while the Min-
istry makes decisions concerning the control measures in case of a suspicion and/or 
outbreak.       
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The amount of compensation is based on the value of the animals before the outbreak 
or an equivalent value in the absence of realistic market prices. The final amount to be 
paid to the individual farmer is determined by the Ministry. In order to provide incen-
tives for early disease reporting, the amount compensated is reduced to 50 per cent of 
the market value for animals with visible disease symptoms and no compensation for 
dead animals. These animal numbers are obtained at the first visit by the veterinarian 
after the farmer has reported an outbreak of a disease. The Animal Health Fund also 
pays for direct costs for non-commercial holders in order to provide them with incen-
tives to report animal diseases early.  
 
Farmers are obligated to meet certain hygiene standards at the farm which are 
checked by a veterinarian. If it is found that the outbreak was the fault of the farmer 
himself or certain conditions are not met, economic penalties can be imposed on the 
farmer. 
 
Positive incentives 
This system allocates financial responsibility to the production chain who decides on 
the prevention of disease epidemics. The ministry decides on control measures in case 
of a disease outbreak. It also provides incentives for early reporting to reduce the 
overall losses caused by the disease outbreak. 
 
Negative incentives 
A minor weakness of this scheme is that it does not provide strong incentives for 
farmers that plan to leave production after a disease outbreak because they do not pay 
levies after a disease outbreak. All they lose is from consequential losses and reduced 
compensation in case of a visibly diseased animal or dead animal.  
 
After the ceiling of the amount to be compensated by the Product Board is reached, 
producers do not meet any of these direct costs but only the consequential losses. 
5.4. Case II: Germany
4
 
In Germany there are different schemes with public involvement in compensating 
livestock farmers in case of specific livestock disease outbreaks. However, the most 
                                                        
 
4 This section is mainly based on section 4.3 in FCEC (2006: 46ff.) and chapter 11 in Koontz et al. 
(2006).  
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important one is the Animal Disease Fund (Tierseuchenkasse in German). Generally, 
for every federal German State (Bundesland), there exists one such Animal Disease 
Fund. These are public entities controlled by a board whose members are chosen from 
the State Ministry, veterinary authorities and farmer organizations. The compensation 
and financing schemes are illustrated in Figure 5.3. The Governing Board adminis-
trating the Fund (together with a Board of Directors) as shown in the figure. It decides 
on amendments to the statutes; budget and contributions from livestock keepers; ap-
pointing auditors; and approve payments not based on statutory legislation etc.     
 
Figure 5.3. German compensation and financing schemes with public in-
 volvement 
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Source:  FCEC (2006: 47).  
 
 
However, the legal basis for the Animal Diseases Funds is Animal Disease Act which 
prescribes e.g. the animals that should be compensated. The Act also serves to ensure 
animal keeper’s cooperation in disease control and in the mitigation of the economic 
losses resulting from the dead of suspected and infected animals. Each federal State 
passes an Implementation Act which prescribes the details of managing the Animal 
Disease Fund. Therefore, the specific governance of the Funds might differ between 
the different federal States.     
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The Animal Disease Funds are the major bodies responsible for animal disease pre-
vention, improving animal health and controlling disease outbreak. Furthermore, they 
are responsible for establishing and financing of infectious disease outbreak control. 
These Animal Disease Funds work hand in hand with veterinary authorities and the 
local Government to implement eradication and prevention measures that are decided 
by the Government.   
 
By law, each state has to reimburse farmers for animals compulsorily culled. The re-
imbursement is made by the Animal Disease Fund which is 50 per cent funded by the 
State Government and 50 per cent funded by levies paid by livestock farmers. The 
Animal Disease Act requires that contributions have to be collected for each of the 
animal species. However, it is possible to relate the contributions to herd sizes and 
infection risks as well as the characteristics of the animals.     
 
In general, farmers are compensated the value of culled animals whereas the costs in-
volved in the rendering and disposing of the animals are not including in the compen-
sation payment, (Koontz, et al., 2006: 141). Livestock farmers have to pay a compul-
sory levy to the Animal Disease Fund and have to report the number of animals at the 
farm each year. Annual levies calculated for each animal have to be approved by the 
State Government. The levies can be differentiated according to animal age, herd size 
and hygienic practices implemented at the farm level and the absence or presence of 
infectious diseases.  
 
The Animal Disease Funds cover diseases that are defined as notifiable diseases and 
compensate losses from public ordered culling or losses from animals which died af-
ter destruction has been ordered as well as died animals if the dead has been caused 
by the notifiable disease. Animals that have died before notification of the disease 
outbreak are only indemnified by 50 per cent which is an incentive for farmers to no-
tify disease outbreaks early. In case of a disease outbreak, if funds from the Animal 
Disease Fund are not sufficient, the federal State is liable for deficits. However, farm-
ers finance their share of these deficits by paying higher fees in the future. 
 
Costs for losses on healthy farms in restriction zones and corresponding marketing 
bans are not covered, but parts of the Animal Disease Fund might be used for preven-
tive animal health programs to reduce losses from animal diseases. A number of in-
surance companies offer coverage against e.g. consequential damage and economic 
losses resulting from isolation and surveillance zones.  
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Positive incentives 
This scheme shares responsibility between the federal State which is responsible for 
making decisions about culling, movement restrictions etc. and the farmers who are 
the owners of the animals and have the responsibility to prevent and control diseases 
at the farm level.  
 
This scheme provides incentives for early disease notification as dead animals are on-
ly indemnified by 50 per cent and if there is late reporting their indemnification can 
be reduced accordingly. 
 
Negative incentives 
A minor weakness is that farmers that do not expect to continue with livestock pro-
duction after an outbreak do not have the right incentives to prevent disease except for 
the losses incurred in case of 50 per cent indemnification and consequential losses 
since they don’t pay future levies.  
5.5. Differences between the three schemes   
As revealed there are some major differences between the Danish compensation and 
cost-sharing schemes and the corresponding schemes in the Netherlands and Germa-
ny, respectively. 
 
One significant difference is that statutory veterinary funds are established in both the 
Netherlands and Germany, but not in Denmark. In both countries these funds are part-
ly financed by contributions from livestock owners and governed by boards which 
have their own decision-making authorities. This is not the case in Denmark where 
the direct compensation costs, i.e. the culling and rendering of suspicious and infected 
animals, are public financed as part of the Governmental budget. In all three countries 
a share of the public financed outbreak costs might be reimbursed from the Veterinary 
Fund in EU.     
       
One significant difference between the Danish and Dutch compensation rules is that 
in the later system no compensation for dead animals due to an epidemic disease is 
paid in order to provide farmers with incentives for early disclosure reporting. In 
Denmark all dead animals from a listed disease are compensated when the disease has 
been reported to the veterinary authorities.     
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Another main difference between the Danish and Dutch schemes is that the incentives 
for the producers and for the Government are different in the Dutch scheme when the 
ceiling of compensation is reached. Above the ceiling the Dutch producers do not 
bear any financial responsibility of the direct costs to combat an outbreak. 
 
A major difference between the Danish and German schemes is that there is an Ani-
mal Disease Fund for each state. This makes it possible to take account of regional 
differences with respect to e.g. the farm structure and the epidemic risks among re-
gions.         
 
Another interesting difference is that there are more experiences in Germany with risk 
adjusted compensation and farmer contribution payments than in Denmark. For ex-
ample, about 15 years ago the compensation payments were adjusted according to the 
size of the farm. The German Animal Disease Act also makes it possible for the fed-
eral States to take account of individual infection risks etc. in collecting the contribu-
tion from the farmer. However, it is unclear to what extent this option is utilized by 
the federal States.    
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6. Strategic options for improved disease prevention     
The previous chapters indicate that major aspects of the current system would gain 
from a restructuring in order to move towards a more effective animal disease preven-
tion. Many stakeholders are involved in the protection of animals and their different 
incentives are in many cases badly (if at all) coordinated. Often the payments for dis-
ease outbreaks are based on policies which crowd-out private incentives and thus do 
not provide the necessary incentives to improve disease prevention among farmers. 
This implies that government responses to disease outbreaks are too often crisis-
driven.    
 
In order to be able to provide better recommendations for more strategic changes in 
the current system, we need to know more about several fundamental issues. This 
chapter therefore poses a series of vital questions where more research is called for. 
As such the chapter addresses the features of an improved animal health policy where 
focus is more directed towards prevention rather than cure and where compensation 
schemes and the financing of these schemes provide improved incentives to animal 
keepers and others to maximize their effort to keep animals healthy. Improved animal 
health starts with a clear understanding of the sharing of responsibilities and costs 
among farmers, the public and eventually other stakeholders.                                                              
6.1. Sharing the responsibilities and costs 
When considering cost-sharing issues the first level concerns the overall sharing be-
tween the government and the livestock sector. As mentioned previously there are 
many arguments in favor of public intervention because of externalities and the non-
exclusive nature of risk prevention. On top of that the government clearly benefits 
from risk prevention among livestock farmers since this ensures food supply and safe-
ty and therefore affects important health issues among the population. Furthermore, 
the responsibilities and thus the cost-sharing between the different livestock branches 
in agriculture, i.e. the pig, cattle and poultry sectors etc. should be clarified. Should 
the cost-sharing scheme include all farmers in the agricultural livestock sector or 
should there be established a cost-sharing scheme for each branch of animals?    
  
Broadly speaking, the “golden rule” of the cost-sharing literature is that when sharing 
costs no agent should be forced to pay more than their “stand-alone cost”, that is, 
more than the cost of their outside option, see e.g. Young (1985). In the above case 
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this means that the government should not cover more than the expected loss to the 
population from an epidemic disease outbreak (i.e. the “social costs”) in a situation 
where there is regulation but no compensation to farmers from the government. 
Likewise, the livestock sector – or the subsectors! - should not be forced to pay more 
than their expected total profit loss from a disease outbreak (which here does not in-
clude the “social costs”). Obviously, these values will be very difficult to estimate in 
practice and the stand-alone cost principle therefore remains only an abstract notion 
which will require further simplification in order to be operational. Matters are further 
complicated by the fact that government regulation itself influences the costs of the 
industry. Since the government as a regulator sets up the “rules of the game” (zones 
with movement standstills, vaccination programs, penalty systems etc.), it is im-
portant that they share the cost of the consequences in order not to “over protect” the 
population at the expense of the livestock industry. All in all, it remains an open ques-
tion how a suitable model can be developed in order to analyze optimal cost-sharing 
between the government and the livestock sector. Issues that deserve special attention 
are: 
Design of prevention incentive schemes: 
The expected costs from disease outbreaks should be kept at an efficient (low) 
level. Therefore risks should be controlled. How can farmers be incentivized to 
increase their risk preventive efforts? Note here that we do not want prevention 
at any cost – as a rule of thumb we should induce prevention until the marginal 
cost of prevention equals the marginal gain from reduced risk. In practice, it is 
clearly difficult (if not impossible) to determine the optimal level of prevention 
and due to the non-rival nature of reduced risk there seems to be a need for 
some kind of mechanism which induces risk preventing efforts among farmers. 
What should this mechanism look like?   
 
Design of movement restrictions: 
Is there an optimal way to set up movement restriction zones? Can we estimate 
costs and benefits and weigh these with the risks involved? How does the loca-
tion of these zones influence the incentives of farmers and other stakeholders? 
What is the regulator’s incentive when setting up zones (protection and surveil-
lance zones)? 
 
Concerning the two latter questions: The regulator has incentive to set up zones 
that are too large in order to avoid various potential problems of political na-
ture (to be on the safe side) – therefore it is important that the public also cover 
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part of the costs from standstill restrictions (i.e. welfare slaughter costs). The 
farmers on the other hand will have incentives to circumvent the restrictions by 
moving their animals around after restrictions have been announced – this will 
be an important element when designing incentive based schemes.   
  
What are the costs and benefits of compartmentalization versus zoning? The 
idea of compartmentalization is that a country might define subpopulations 
with different health status. Such subpopulations may be defined by biosecurity 
measures related to disease prevention.  
 
Design of compensation schemes: 
How to set up optimal compensation rules? Although compensations may pro-
vide incentives for effective and rapid control measures, they may not provide 
incentives for prevention above minimum legislative requirements. Should the 
compensation rules be equal for all types of farms, e.g., cattle, pigs and poultry 
or should the rules be differentiated according to e.g., type of production and 
eventually other farm characteristics?  
6.2. Prevention index 
Naturally next step in the cost-sharing process concerns allocation internally in the 
agricultural and food industry between different branches, i.e. the cattle, pig and poul-
try sectors, and in the end between the individual farmers of a given industry branch. 
With respect to the latter, we shall here propose that the cost-sharing scheme is based 
on a suitably defined farm or herd level based prevention index.  
 
One idea is to make livestock farmers’ contributions to the insurance system correlat-
ed with (proportional to) their prevention levels and efforts and as such be the founda-
tion for price discrimination when setting up the overall insurance scheme. This pro-
vides the farmers with further (ex-ante) incentives for risk prevention.  
 
As a possible tool, the prevention index should be an aggregate proxy of farmers’ risk 
preventing efforts. The main question is of course what should be contained by this 
measure? And how should the different risk factors included in the index be weighted 
in the final aggregation? Should it be absolute or relative to other farmers’ efforts? 
And for practical relevance - are the relevant data available – and if not, what is re-
quired?    
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Concerning the construction of the prevention index, the scope is the first thing to be 
decided: Which type of diseases should be covered (as mentioned there is currently 
different lists of diseases with varying degree of public awareness), and in close rela-
tion to that, should the index cover only animal health issues or should it cover health 
in the broader sense of animal welfare and general food safety? Practical issues seem 
to speak in favor of an index more narrowly related to animal health issues and dis-
eases related only to “List 1” types such as shown in Table 4.3. In general, it is im-
portant that farmers can see a direct influence on the index value from their health 
preventing efforts. Broader issues related to animal welfare and food safety at large 
would ideally be interesting to include but practical application of the index is likely 
to limit the level of possible abstraction as many measurable effects on animal wel-
fare and food safety may only present themselves in the long run. But it remains an 
important discussion and one which is closely related to practical aspects of imple-
mentation of the index.  
 
Secondly, there are several ways of looking at production of animal health and this 
becomes relevant when searching for relevant factors to include in the prevention in-
dex. For example, if we consider the input side, relevant factors may include number 
of vet visits while considering the production process itself puts the organization of 
production into focus, such as the specific design of stables etc. On the output side, 
the number of animals without disease annotations may constitute an example of a 
potentially relevant factor. 
 
The specific focus becomes important since if we for example focus on the produc-
tion process and reward farmers for implementing a certain design of their production 
system (which may seem superior from a biosecurity point of view) we may poten-
tially introduce a source of inefficiency in the system by “forcing” some farmers 
away from what would otherwise have been the optimal technological solution given 
their specific situation (see also the further comments on the negative side effects of 
the prevention index below).  
 
It has also been argued elsewhere, e.g. see (European Commission, 2007), that a rat-
ing of farmers should include such things as disease status and various issues related 
to biosecurity compliance, all potentially relevant aspects. As mentioned, it is crucial 
that there is a clear correlation between farmers’ risks preventing efforts and the index 
value and that these can be registered by the farmers in the short run. However, the 
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index may partly depend on fixed factors such as geographical location and current 
production facilities in order to reflect the risks associated with these factors (which 
of course may be influenced by management decisions in the long run). It appears 
though that there are good arguments in favor of weighing factors that are directly in-
fluenced by the farmers risk preventing behavior higher than the fixed factors in the 
prevention index. 
 
Another relevant aspect is whether the index should be absolute or relative. That is, 
should we measure the index value on an absolute scale defined for each factor and 
then aggregate or should the performance of the farms be measured relative other 
farms in the sample based on a multifactor “best performance” frontier (as it is known 
from e.g. productivity analysis). Again, there are no clear cut and straightforward ar-
guments in favor of either. However, theoretical literature seems to suggest that a rel-
ative approach will be preferable, see e.g. Bogetoft (1994) and Bogetoft (1995). In 
particular, it can be shown that a relative index (designed on the basis of a multifactor 
“best performance” frontier) contains sufficient information for the construction of 
optimal incentive schemes. Below we shall briefly sketch the idea behind a relative 
evaluation. Consider the illustration in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1. Absolute versus relative prevention index 
Vet 
Visits (y)
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a
bd
Purchased animals (x)
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Say there are two relevant factors to be included in the prevention index: the number 
of vet visits, y,  (where more visits is a proxy for better prevention) and the number of 
purchased animals, x,  (where more animals is a proxy for worse prevention). A farm 
is represented by an observation (x,y). Loosely speaking, one farm, a, is said to domi-
nate another farm, b, with respect to prevention effort if b has purchased more ani-
mals than a and has had fewer vet visits than a. On the basis of observations from the 
sample of all farms we can now estimate the undominated frontier, e.g. by convex en-
velopment of the data points. A given farm (b in the figure) can then be measured 
against the frontier using different types of projections onto the frontier – e.g. radial 
projection, shortest distance, hyperbolic distance etc., depending on the type of meas-
ure that fits best with the situation at hand. In the Figure, we have illustrated three dif-
ferent directional distances; one for each factor and one where distance is measured 
relative in the direction (-1,1) indicating that the benchmark farm should be farm a in 
the figure. A part from decisions concerning the appropriate measure there are also 
issues of estimation techniques for finding the frontier, underlying restrictions on 
weights (prices) etc. known from the literature on efficiency analysis, see e.g. Bo-
getoft and Otto (2011). Compared to an absolute index with fixed weights (wx, wy), 
the above relative approach is much more flexible and acknowledges that there may 
not be constant returns to scale in effort. For example, farm d in the figure in consid-
ered benchmark farm using the relative approach whereas an absolute ranking would 
render d lower ranked than a which is top ranked given the weights.  
 
It is obvious from the above discussion that the specific construction of the index 
should be carefully researched before taken into use. Determining the various factors 
to be included and restrictions on weights of the index is a job that needs to be done in 
cooperation with the veterinary sciences. Moreover, it should probably be considered 
to publicly announce the result of the prevention index in order to obtain the best in-
centive effect. This is known from other areas of public monitoring and control with 
resulting “Smiley” evaluations, and typically has the effect that various stakeholders’ 
potential response further incentivizes the agents.  
 
Having talked about introducing the index and its possible construction, it is also im-
portant to analyze any potential or indirect negative side effects from implementing a 
prevention index in practice. For instance, if frequent movement of animals increases 
risk, the index will punish trade and this will subsequently limit competition and gains 
from trade. Likewise, if we punish geographical density this may influence the geo-
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graphical structure negatively in the long run – it should favor large farms distant 
from each other which will mean the end of small rural communities etc. All this must 
however be carefully researched before introducing the index in practice. 
 
Above it was mentioned that the prevention index can be used to price discriminate 
when paying the premium of the insurance scheme. Another potential idea is that the 
prevention index may be used to reallocate costs between farmers ex-ante periodically 
in the short run: To improve incentives for preventive efforts, farmers need to see a 
clear connection between the immediate costs of effort (either direct costs or indirect 
transaction costs) and the benefits in terms of improved animal health and following 
reduced production costs in long run. It has already been mentioned that the non-
exclusive nature of reduced infection risk and the obvious externalities involved are 
serious obstacles for this.   
 
To overcome this problem, we may imagine an institution where farmers (each year) 
pay a certain insurance fee per animal common for everyone (as they already do 
now). However, unlike what is done now, if no disease outbreak occurred during the 
year, funds are returned to farmers but this time based on their prevention index. This 
means that some farmers will receive less than they paid on account (if their preven-
tion index is low) while others will have a net gain (if their prevention index is high). 
As such there is a reallocation going on between farmers. In effect, farmers with low 
prevention efforts pay to farmers with high prevention efforts in order to compensate 
those for their positive externalities. 
  
In case of disease outbreak, farmers can be reimbursed based on the prevention index 
according to a suitable insurance system where the government could offer credit in 
case of insufficient funds at the time of outbreak. Compared to the idea above where 
the prevention index is used to price discriminate between farmers at the time when 
premiums are paid into the system, farmers are here discriminated when money goes 
out of the system as either refunded or reimbursed.   
6.3. Risk assessment and its relation to spacious factors 
Part of the information contained by the prevention index could also relate to risk as-
sessment in networks. We have already mentioned that movement of livestock in-
creases infection risks. Geographical density of farms is another relevant risk factor. 
These factors are spacious in the sense that farms can be seen as in network relations 
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with their geographic location and trade patterns. The network here represents a kind 
of map that may prove useful not only for risk assessment but also for design of 
movement restriction zones in order to control and manage disease outbreaks. An in-
teresting issue related to the prevention index is to what extend that risk is correlated 
with various centrality notions from graph theory that describes the importance of 
agents or links in a network, see e.g. Jackson (2008).  
  
The literature on Social Network Analysis (SNA) provides the necessary tools to ana-
lyze and interpret the contacts between farmers which can be associated with animal 
location and other forms of contact (e.g. through trade, movement of livestock, human 
contact, veterinary contact and even through the air when neighboring another farm). 
Given that there are different influencing factors it becomes essential to apply differ-
ent network centrality measures. Regression analysis can then be conducted to deter-
mine which of the influencing factors has the largest effect on increasing or decreas-
ing the infection risk. 
 
The challenge is twofold: First to develop a theoretical model, that is a network model 
reflecting vital elements that influences infection risk and relevant centrality notions, 
and second to either obtain estimates based on simulation studies or to obtain concrete 
empirical estimations. This requires close cooperation with the veterinary sciences.    
 
Can we measure the marginal change in the overall risk of the network when adding 
or removing a farm with a certain centrality index?  
 
In connection with design of restriction zones tools from network analysis can also be 
used to analyze what will happen to the surveillance zone when adding or removing a 
tie from the surveillance area. It can be determined whether there is a tendency for 
farmers to add more trading ties to their network and thereby increase their level of 
centrality. One way to investigate centrality is by using Exponentially Random Graph 
Models (ERGM). By using ERGM it is possible to measure any general local effect 
important in explaining the structure of the surveillance zone. To estimate the ERGM 
parameters, Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods (Snijders, 2002) can be used.  
 
Previous literature such as Bigras-Poulin et al. (2006) and Bajardi et al. (2012) apply 
network approaches (including centrality measures) on the trading of livestock to in-
vestigate disease spreading. We propose to go further in analyzing vital elements that 
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influence the infection risk and the overall organization of the protection and surveil-
lance zones.  
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7. English summary and recommendations     
The aim of the report is to investigate the economic incentives for preventing infec-
tious animal diseases at the farm level in order to achieve a fair and efficient sharing 
of the responsibilities and costs associated with risk management and surveillance of 
animal diseases as described in EU’s Animal Health Strategy 2007 - 2013.   
               
The report provides an overview of the biosecurity concept and describes the general 
mechanisms behind economic incentives. Specifically, the report addresses the fol-
lowing questions: 
 
1. What are the existing economic incentives and barriers for animal disease 
prevention, especially for pig and cattle farmers? 
2. What are the current compensation and risk financing schemes for infectious 
disease outbreaks in Denmark and how does it compare to schemes in other 
countries? 
3. What are the opportunities for providing livestock farmers with improved in-
centives to prevent animal diseases? 
 
The focus is on highly infectious cattle and pig diseases that have serious conse-
quences for health and production as well as the whole society (e.g. diseases catego-
rized as List 1 diseases by the Danish veterinary authorities). These diseases include 
for example the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Bluetongue and Classical Swine 
Fever (CSF). They all have the potential to cause widespread economic losses in case 
of an outbreak.  
 
The analytical part of the report consists of chapters 3 to 6 where it is analyzed how 
the existing direct as well as indirect economic incentives might be modified in order 
to provide livestock farmers with better economic incentives for improved disease 
prevention. The analyses carried out are mainly based on qualitative descriptions, as-
sessments and evaluations.  
 
Chapter 3 contains a rather detailed description of the biosecurity principles, plans 
and specific activities in pig and cattle herds. The main points are that:   
 
 purchase and other movements of animals between herds ought to be mini-
mized 
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 animals ought to be purchased from herds with higher health status 
 animals moved between origin and destination herds ought to be quarantined  
 double fencing ought to be adopted if pasturing is utilized 
 signs with “entrance forbidden” ought to be set up 
 as far as possible all instruments and equipment ought to be available on the 
farm so they not need to be moved between farms 
 pick-up vehicles and the drivers ought not to be in close contact with animals 
on the farm  
 animals ought to be reared in batches by use of all-in – all-out production 
systems  
 mixing of young and older animals ought to be avoided 
 rodent control ought to be established   
 it is not possible give exact probabilities when a set of biosecurity measures 
are sufficient to prevent transmission of infection or when it is “overkill”    
 
In Chapter 4 are the economic role of and interactions between private and public in-
centives in disease prevention in cattle and pig production analyzed. The main points 
are that:  
 farmers’ private incentives may lead to an underinvestment in disease pre-
vention 
 to induce risk preventing behavior among producers it is necessary to make a 
risk classification of livestock farms  
 the risk classification ought to be based on simple and transparent factors  
 deductibles ought to be introduced in a cost-sharing scheme to reduce farm-
ers’ undesirable behavior 
 farmers’ payments to the cost-sharing scheme ought to be a combination of 
ex-ante and ex-post payments in relation to a disease outbreak 
 farmers ought not to receive any compensation for sick and dead animals but 
receive full compensation for healthy animals that need to be culled to ensure 
economic incentives for rapid disclosure of an outbreak 
 affected farmers in established restriction zones ought to be compensated in 
case of an outbreak, but the compensation should not exceed the minimum of 
the production costs and the market price 
 an insurance scheme with public co-financing ought to be based on mandato-
ry participation of all relevant livestock keepers          
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 because of low or seldom occurrence of certain diseases, the individual 
farmer may underestimate the risk of getting serious livestock diseases and 
therefore reduces his preventive efforts         
 
In chapter 5 the current Danish compensation and cost-sharing schemes used in case 
of an outbreak of a contagious animal disease is investigated and compared to the cor-
responding schemes in The Netherlands and Germany, respectively. The main points 
are that:   
 
 statutory veterinary funds are established in both the Netherlands and Ger-
many, but not in Denmark          
 the Dutch compensation scheme does not provide any compensation for dead 
animals due to an epidemic disease in order to provide farmers with incen-
tives for early disclosure reporting    
 the incentives for the producers and for the government change in the Dutch 
scheme when the ceiling of compensation is reached. Above the ceiling the 
Dutch producers do not bear any financial responsibility of the direct costs to 
combat an outbreak 
 in Germany there is an Animal Disease Fund for each federal State which 
makes it possible to take account of regional differences with respect to e.g. 
the farm structure and the epidemic risks among regions         
 there are more experiences in Germany with risk adjusted compensation and 
farmer contribution payments than in Denmark        
 
In chapter 6 are some strategic options for improvements in the on-farm biosecurity 
by use of economic incentives discussed. The main points are that:   
 
 the cost-sharing scheme ought be based on a suitably defined farm or herd 
level based prevention index 
 the prevention index ought to be related to animal health and production is-
sues and not for example animal welfare   
 it is crucial that there is a clear correlation between farmers’ risks preventing 
efforts and the index value and that the included variable are objectively 
measured   
 it ought to be considered to publicly announce the result of the prevention in-
dex in order to obtain the best incentive effects 
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 the specific construction of the index and all its effects ought to be carefully 
researched and politically clarified before it is take into use  
 vital elements that influence the infection risk and the organization of the 
protection and surveillance zones in case of a disease outbreak ought to be 
analyzed   
                   
Thus, the answer to the first question concerning the existing economic incentives ad-
dressed in the report is that no economic incentives exist among farmers to ensure a 
social optimal level of animal disease prevention. Therefore, our recommendation is 
that the possibilities for the development of a prevention index should be researched 
and all potential positive and eventually negative effects carefully clarified. Devel-
opment of such an index should be considered as an important first step towards a 
more fair and efficient sharing of all the social costs between livestock famers (and 
eventually other stakeholders in the supply chain) on the one hand and the public sec-
tor on the other hand. Practical experiences from e.g. the SPF system and scientific 
knowledge obtained from e.g. the development of animal welfare indexes should be 
utilized. 
 
The answer to the second question concerning compensation and financing schemes 
is that we don’t have any independent veterinary fund in Denmark while this is the 
case in other countries that we usually compare ourselves to. Thus, the recommenda-
tion is that such an independent veterinary fund (or several veterinary funds) should 
be considered established to provide another mechanism for building a stronger rela-
tionship between farmers’ preventive efforts and their contributions to financing rele-
vant initiatives both in peace time, e.g. in periods with no suspicion and no outbreaks, 
and in periods with a serious disease outbreak. Here it seems natural to investigate the 
role that the existing production levy funds might have in the establishment of such a 
veterinary fund(s).    
                 
The answer to third question addressed in the report concerning the opportunities to 
provide farmers with better economic incentives for disease prevention is that alt-
hough no private incentives exist to reach the social optimal level of animal disease 
prevention, there are several opportunities to provide livestock farmers with improved 
economic incentives to prevent animal diseases. The linkage between the huge varia-
tion in the adopted biosecurity measures among livestock keepers as described in sec-
tion 3.4 and the different types of efficient prevention as described in section 4.3 pro-
vides the key to see these opportunities. In section 4.3 it was shown that an efficient 
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prevention can based on both control and sanctions; learning and information sharing; 
and development of new innovative measures.    
 
Thus, it is recommended that the existing legislation and statutory rules are better 
controlled and enforced. For example, it provides the wrong signals to farmers when 
there are legal requirements to develop biosecurity plans on big pig and cattle farms, 
but there are no consequences associated with not developing such a plan (see section 
3.4).         
 
Furthermore, it is recommended that best practice with respect to animal disease pre-
vention is identified and documented and the knowledge obtained disseminated to all 
livestock farmers. Benchmarking is a well-known approach used in the advisory ser-
vice to motivate decision-makers to make changes in their production.    
 
Finally, it is recommended that the practical development activities are enhanced with 
respect to animal disease prevention by proving financial support, e.g. through the 
production levy funds and the Danish Agricultural Development and Demonstration 
Program (GUDP), to carry out interdisciplinary innovation projects. The expectation 
is that enhanced participation of practical livestock farmers in the development of 
new preventive measures might both lead to more practical solutions and improved 
incentives among farmers to accept greater responsibility for the risk management of 
animal diseases.        
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